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THE POWER OF DIRECTORS TO TERMINATE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION: THE
DEATH OF THE DERIVATIVE SUIT?
George W. Dent, Jr.

*

Shareholders' derivative suits 1 have long played2 a crucial role in
assuring a modicum of integrity and competence in the management of
corporations. 3 Nonetheless, real or imagined abuses 4 of the derivative
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
B.A., Columbia College, 1969; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1973. Professor Dent was the Orison
S. Marden Fellow at New York University School of Law while this article was being written and
wishes to express his gratitude for the financial assistance of the Orison S. Marden Fund. Gratitude is also expressed for the research assistance of Susan C. Zuckerman and Jay Zitter.
I A shareholders' derivative suit is a suit brought by shareholders on behalf of and for the
direct benefit of the corporation to redress harm to the corporation. The derivative suit permits a
shareholder to assert a corporate claim "[w]hen the corporate cause of action is for some reason
not asserted by the corporation itself. . . ." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES§ 360, at 756 (2d ed. 1970). The derivative suit has also
been called a shareholder's or stockholder's suit, and a minority shareholder's suit. See id; W..
CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 868-69 (4th ed. 1969); Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes On Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980, 980 (1957); Stickells, Derivative Suits-The Requirement of Demand Upon the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. REV. 433, 433 (1953).
The derivative suit is to be distinguished from the representative suit, in which the shareholder
complains of an injury not to the corporation but directly to himself and other shareholders.
Haudek, The Selllement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part /, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 768
(1968).
2 The shareholders' derivative suit is often said to have originated with Foss v. Harbottle, 67
Eng. Rep. !89 (Ch. 1843). The right of minority shareholders to secure relief for managerial
excesses, however, was recognized in America as early as Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222
(N.Y. 1832), and in England as early as Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828), 39
Eng. Rep. 58 (Ch. 1829). See generally Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 396 U.S. 53! (1970). The derivative suit has been authorized in nearly all states.
Eg., DEL CoDE ANN. til. 8, § 327 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 626 (McKinney 1963); Berger,
"Disregarding the Corporate Entity".for Stockholders' Bentjit, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 816 n.60
(1955); Prunty, supra note I, at 980.
3 Dean Rostow has called the derivative suit "the most important procedure the law has yet
developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is
Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoRPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason
ed. 1959). Justice Jackson called it "the chief regulator of corporate management." Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383
U.S. 363, 371 (1966); Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); N. LATTIN, THE
LAW oF CoRPORATIONS § 115, at 457 (2d ed. 1971) ("The derivative suit is the minority shareholders' one effective remedy against management's abuse of its trusteeship."). A wide variety of
corporate injuries has been redressed by derivative suits. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative
Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-82 (1967); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in
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suit process have prompted courts and state legislatures to erect many
obstacles to the bringing of these suits. 5 Many of these obstacles seem
designed more to thwart all derivative suits, including those that are
meritorious, than to prevent alleged abuses. 6
One such obstacle is the rule adopted in many cases that the board
of directors' refusal to sue or its active opposition to the derivative suit?
will, under some circumstances, warrant dismissal of the suit. Although this rule is by no means new, 8 the courts have begun to use it
with increasing frequency. The rule generally has been held not to apply if a majority of the board is implicated in the alleged wrong. 9 Several recent cases, however, have held that if a duly appointed
committee of directors (sometimes caiied a "special litigation committee"10) not implicated in the alleged wrong decides not to sue, that deci-

I

,I

I
(

Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. !68, 194 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO
Comment].
· 4 For a discussion of the alleged abuses, see text accompanying notes 203-22 infra.
5 These obstacles include the following requirements: ownership of stock at the commencement and during the pendency of the suit; ownership of stock at the time of the alleged wrong,
known as the contemporaneous ownership requirement; allegation with particularity of the facts
constituting the corporate cause of action, often interpreted to require the plaintiff in effect to
plead evidence; demands on the board and the shareholders to take action with respect to the
alleged wrong or a showing that such demands would be futile; fair representation of the shareholders by the plaintiff; provision by plaintiff of security for expenses, including attorneys' fees, of
the corporation; indemnification of corporate personnel for litigation expenses; bringing of suit
within the period of a short statute of limitations for certain actions against directors, officers, and
shareholders; and reimbursement of defendants' expenses. See generally H. HENN, supra note I,
§§ 359, 361-367, 372, 378; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, §§ 105-106.
6 A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE§ 252, at 399-400 (1976); Dykstra, supra note
3, at 75; Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. I, 2-3
(1947).
Notwithstanding these obstacles, derivative suits have managed to survive and perhaps even
to thrive. See Dykstra, supra note 3, at 74-75 (finding a 50% increase in derivative suits noted in
West's Seventh Decennial Digest for 1956-1966 over the number reported for the prior decade).
Cf Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 65-66 (1968) (concluding that security-for-expenses statutes are not "a significant deterrent to derivative litigation").
7 The courts have not distinguished between the board's active opposition to a derivative suit
and its mere refusal to sue. There are, however, factors that would warrant the board's refusal to
sue but not dismissal of a derivative suit. See text accompanying notes 112 & 162-63 infra.
8 The rule is at least as old as Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
9 See note 31 infra.
10 Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Cramer v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoffv. General Tel. & Elec.
Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 11,
·1980); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at 11, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Auerbach v.
Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 1980) ("Independent Investigation Committee"); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) ("Special Review Committee"); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel.
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sion will block even a derivative suit against a majority of the
directors. II
A derivative suit generally may be brought only when the board
has refused to sue.I 2 Thus, a rule permitting the board to terminate
derivative suits which, by hypothesis, it refuses to bring itself could
mean the death of the derivative suit. A decision by the board or some
of its members to terminate litigation against directors entails potential
conflicts of interest too serious to ignore. If the board is disabled completely from terminating derivative suits, however, the corporation
could be saddled with expensive, frivolous, vexatious litigation. This
article will analyze the problems raised by the board's attempt to termi- ,
nate shareholder suits and will advance proposals to deal with those
·
problems.
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Modem corporation laws generally provide that the business of a
corporation shall be managed by or under the supervision of a board of
directors.I 3 The power to manage corporate business usually includes
the power to determine whether the corporation shall sue for redress of
a wrong it is alleged to have suffered.I 4 When the alleged wrongdoers
are not affiliated with the corporation, the board can be expected to
weigh dispassionately the benefits and detriments of litigation. Where
the directors themselves are alleged to have wronged the corporation,
however, a decision by the directors whether to sue themselves obviCorp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Special Review Committee"); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Special Committee on Litigation"); Maldonado v. Flynn, No.
4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) ("Independent Investigation Committee").
IT See text accompanying notes 51-69 infra.
i
I2iSee H. HENN, supra note I, § 364. Until recently, it could safely be said that a derivative
action also could be brought where the board obviously would refuse to sue, as where the alleged
wrongdoers constituted a majority of the board or otherwise dominated the corporation. See
notes 17-20 and accompanying text i'!fra. If, however, as some courts have recently held, a committee of nonimplicated directors may decide whether such suits should be brought, see text accompanying notes 51-69 i'!fra, plaintiff may not be able to proceed on the theory that in such cases
the board obviously would refuse to sue. See Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 14
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (complaint dismissed for plaintiff's failure to make demand on board
where board had established a litigation committee).
I3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney
Supp. 1979-1980). See generally N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 69; Note, Economic Institutions and
Values: Fiduciary Responsibility of Corporate Officers and Directors, 36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 343,
357 (1961).
I4 See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917);
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167,
169 (D. Conn. 1950); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 46, 91 N.E. 683, 694 (1910); Barr v.
Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378,329 N.E.2d 180, 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 504-05 (1975); Koral v.
' Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 217, II N.E.2d 883, 884-85 (1937); Passmore v. Allentown & Reading
Traction Co., 267 Pa. 356, 358-59, 110 A. 240, 241 (1920); 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 5822 (rev. perm. ed. 1970).
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ously will not be dispassionate. 15 It is largely to handle such situations
that the law permits shareholder suits on behalf of a corporation. 16
Because the power to manage the corporation resides initially with
the· board, before commencing a derivative action a shareholder generally must make a demand on the board that it bring a suit seeking
redre~s for the alleged wrong.n Where, however, the alleged wrongdoers include a majority of the board 18 or otherwise control the corporation or the board, as through ownership of a majority of the voting
stock, 19 the demand is generally excused on the theory that the demand
would be futile because those who control the corporation cannot be
expected to sue themselves. 20
15 Dispassion also may be absent where the alleged wrongdoers are officers or major shareholders who are not also directors. See notes 147 & 153 and accompanying text itifra.
16 Although state statutes do not limit derivative suits to actions against officers and directors,
most derivative suits take this form. A. CoNARD, supra note 6, § 252, at 401. See Hornstein, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797 (1939) (finding that in
nearly all of the 54 successful derivative suits surveyed, "the defendants included one or more
directors of the corporation"); Rostow, supra note 3, at 48~49.
17 Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882); DiFani v. Riverside County Oil
Co., 201 Cal. 210, 215,256 P. 210,213 (1927); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 277, 283,
125 A. 411, 414 (1924); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 19, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912) .
. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5963; H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365. See generally Note,
Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 74(!
(1960) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD Note]; CHICAGO Comment, note 3 supra. Rule 23.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to "allege with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors .. _ and the reasons
for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1. Many state
statutes and court rules are modeled on federal rule 23.1. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 800(b)(2)
(West 1977); N.J. C1v. PRAC. R. 4:32-5; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 626(c) (McKinney 1963).
The purpose of requiring a demand on the board has been stated variously as giving the
directors the opportunity to take over the suit, Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir.
1975); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d
1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 364, at 770; giving the
board the opportunity to settle the dispute without litigation, thus promoting judicial economy,
Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America, 259 Minn. 257, 262, 107 N.W.2d 226, 233
( 1961); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 505 (1975);
and preventing interference in corporate affairs until intracorporate remedies have been exhausted, CHICAGO Comment, supra note 3, at 171. See also HARVARD Note, supra, at 748-49.
18 Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964)
(applying Virginia Law); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 316, 144 So. 674, 678
(1932); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 279, 106 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1952); Eston v.
Argus, 328 Mich. 554, 556, 44 N.W.2d 154, 155 (1950); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 192, 30
S.W.2d 976, 979 (1930); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d
497, 505 (1975); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 105, at 417.
19 Craftsman Fin. & Mort. Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Grant v.
Grosnell, 266 S.C. 372,223 S.E.2d 413 (1976); Akin v. Mackie, 203 Tenn. 113, 121,310 S.W.2d
164, 168 (1958); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365.
20 See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5965 and authorities cited therein; H. HENN, supra
note I,§ 365; HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 753. Trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in determining whether the demand should be excused. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14,
§ 5965, at 370 & 374 n.2. Federal courts generally have been liberal in excusing demand under
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Whether the derivative suit may proceed in the face of the board's
opposition to it is unclear. Most courts have held that the board's opposition will warrant termination of a derivative suit in some circumstances. These courts disagree, however, as to what the applicable
standard is and how that standard should be applied.
The positions taken by the courts in the many cases dealing with
the effect of a refusal to sue21 fall into a relatively few categories. A few
courts have simply stated, usually in dictum, that the shareholder is
automatically entitled to sue derivatively if the board refuses to sue. 22
Several courts have held that the board's refusal to sue on a particular
kind of claim (or, in a few cases, on any valid claim) constitutes a
breach of trust; therefore, if a shareholder's complaint states such a
claim, the board's refusal to sue will not bar the derivative suit. 23 Most
courts have held, however, that the board's refusal to sue falls within
the business judgment rule 24 and blocks the derivative suit unless the
plaintiff shows some defect in the board's action. 25
FED. R. C!v. P. 23.1. De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (lOth Cir. 1970). But
see Seigal v. Merrick, No. 2475, slip. op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (complaint dismissed for
plaintiff's failure to make demand on board where board has established a litigation committee).
21 Although this article will mention over 50 such cases, it is surprising that so many derivative
suits have proceeded without discussing this issue. Since a detivative suit generally may proceed
only if the corporation has declined to sue after receiving a shareholder's demand that it sue, see
notes 12 & 17 supra, one would imagine that nearly every derivative suit would follow the board's
refusal to sue and would thus face the question of the effect of that refusal. In cases not raising
this question, perhaps defense attorneys either viewed a defense based on the refusal as hopeless
because a majority of the board was implicated in the alleged wrong or simply overlooked the
defense.
22 See Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1048 (1974); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1927); Maldonado v. Flynn,
No. 4800, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1927); Anderson v. Johnson, 45 R.I. 17, 23, 119 A. 642, 644 (1923); Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v.
Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 151, 131 P. 485, 488 (1913) (dictum).
23 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856) (refusa! to attack a tax that directors
conceded was unconstitutional); Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909) (refusal to
sue to redress alleged fraud); Sullivan v. Mountain, 117 Mont. 224, 160 P.2d 477 (1945) (refusal to
sue to recover illegal commission); Siegman v. Kissel, 71 N.J. Eq. 123, 62 A. 941 ( 1906), ajf'd sub
nom. Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65 A. 910 (1907) (refusal to sue on wrongful payment of dividend); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905) (refusal to
sue on an allegedly valid claim); Epstein v. Schenk, 178 Misc. 607, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (refusal to sue on any clear cause of action). q. HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 762
(derivative suit should always be permitted if alleged wrong is not ratifiable).
24 Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Issner v. Aldrich,
254 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Del. 1966). See also note 65 and accompanying text i'!fra.
25 Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 F. 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1912); Klotz v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burke v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 324 F. Supp.
1125, 1129 (S.D. Ala. 1971), affd, 465 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1972); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v.
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 112-13, 93 N.E.2d 241, 248-49 (1950) (dictum); .Brooks v. Brooks Pontiac, Inc., 143 Mont. 256, 260, 389 P.2d 185, 188 (1964); Noble v.
Farmers Union Trading Co., 123 Mont. 518, 527, 216 P.2d 925, 935 (1950); Chambers v. Chambers & McKee Glass Co., 185 Pa. 105, 109-10, 39 A. 822, 823-24 (1898). q. Miller v. American
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The business judgment rule provides that directors shall not be
liable for harm to the corporation resulting from their decisions if those
decisions lie within the powers of the corporation and the authority of
management and were reasonably made in good faith and with loyalty
and due care; 26 that is, directors are not to be held liable if they have
fulfilled all their duties to the corporation. 27 In many cases, the courts
have overlooked or ignored these requirements of the rule. 28 TechniTeL & TeL Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (derivative suit may proceed where directors'
refusal to sue violates a statute).
26 See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (applying
Michigan law); Pollitz v:Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912); 3A W.
fLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1039, at 38; H. HENN, supra note I,§ 242; N. LATTIN, supra note 3,
§ 78, at 272-73; Note, The Continuing Viability o.f the Business Judgment Rule as a Guidefor Judicial
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 562-63 (1967); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule: A
Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. !51 (1962).
It is widely agreed that the business judgment rule requires due care, which generally imports
a negligence standard. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1891); Miller v. American TeL
& Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 72-74 (1880); Casey v.
Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1039, at 38, 42
n.9, § 1040, at 44, 45 n.l; H. HENN, supra note I, § 234, § 242, at 483; N. LATTIN, supra note 3,
§ 78, at 274. Thus, the rule is consistent with statutes adopted in many states requiring directors to
act with due care or ordinary prudence. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980). Some courts have held the standard of care to be one of gross negligence. 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at 12 N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 78, at 274 & nn.l2 & 13. This
test has been criticized and generally is not followed, 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at
12, § 1040, at 44, 45 n.5; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 78, at 274, although courts have tended to
define negligence narrowly. See note 37 i'!fra.
The duty of due care requires not only good faith and a modicum of effort, but also proper
skill and a reasonable basis for any judgment reached. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880); 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1040, at 44, 45 nn.l & 2, § 1055, at 65 & n.2, § 1061, at 74; H. HENN,
supra note I, § 242, at 482-83. Thus, "a director is chargeable with the knowledge actually possessed or which he might have possessed had he diligently discharged his functions." 3A W.
fLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at 12. Accord, id. § 1059, at 68, 69 n.l; H. HENN, supra note I,
§ 234, at 455.
27 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 242, at 483 ("Business judgment thus, by definition, presupposes an honest, unbiased judgment (compliance with fiduciary duty) reasonably exercised (due
care), and compliance with other applicable requirements."). The rule does not bar inquiry into
the directors' independence. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,631,393 N.E.2d 994, 1001,419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979). It is often stated that the rule frees directors from liability for errors of
judgment, but the rule is unnecessary for that purpose because none of the directors' duties imposes such liability in any case.
28 Many courts have dismissed derivative suits on the ground that the directors' refusal to sue
was sacrosanct under the business judgment rule, even though the courts made no real inquiry as
to whether the decision not to sue (and to oppose the derivative suit) was reached with due care
(including a reasonable investigation) and skill, without any conflict of interest, and had a reasonable b.asis. For example, the business judgment rule does not warrant dismissal of a complaint on
a motion for summary judgment-unless plaintiff admits that the directors have satisfied the
rule-because such a motion raises issues of fact regarding the directors' due care and loyalty.
Nonetheless, many suits have been dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of the business
judgment rule. See, e.g., Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 915 (1963); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 ·N.Y.S.2d 920
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cally, the rule would seem irrelevant as to the effect that a refusal to sue
has on a derivative suit, since the derivative suit seeks neither to hold
the directors liable for their refusal to sue nor to compel the corporation to sue. 29 Nevertheless, the derivative suit is usually barred unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the board's decision not to sue was
ultra vires, or made fraudulently, in bad faith, in breach of trust, or the
like. 30 The board's involvement or collusion in the alleged wrongdoing31 and inexcusable neglect3 2 have also been cited as grounds for allowing the derivative suit to proceed despite a refusal to sue. A few
(1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5
(Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Bennett v. Instrument Systems Corp., 66 A.D.2d
708, 411 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978).
29 q. Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800, slip. op. at 15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) (business judgment rule does not apply to suit alleging self-dealing). The courts, however, often have not so
interpreted the rule. See note 24 and accompanying text supra, and notes 59, 62, & 65 and accompanying text infra.
30 See cases cited in note 25 supra.
31 United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917); Corbus v.
Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 461 (1903); Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S.
450, 460 (1882); Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 9J2, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1962), cerl.
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963). See Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969) (involvement of trustee rendered his refusal ineffective to block shareholder suit); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F.
Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966) (applying Virginia law); Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130
N.E.2d 442, 446, 449 (Ohio C. P. 1954); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 219, II N.E.2d 883,
886 (1937) (shareholder is not barred from bringing suit when receiver who refused to sue participated in the wrongdoing). Cf. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427
(1952) (dictum) (interest of majority of board "might be argued" to preclude them from terminating derivative suit); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 106-07, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978)
(board's early opposition to derivative suit justified finding that it had not exercised independent
judgment).
The board's refusal to sue generally will not thwart the suit where a majority of directors is
involved in the alleged wrong. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,460 (1882) (plaintiff
may sue if he alleges that a majority of the directors "are aciing for their own interest"); Galef v.
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5905 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (court may dismiss where a disinterested board majority opposes the suit); Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493
(3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966) (plaintiff must allege "that the directors of the
corporation are personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing"); Swanson v. Traer,
249 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1957) (suit dismissed where a majority of directors was "admittedly
honest" and "not ... involved in the alleged wrongs"); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank
(N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judgment denied where the board "participated in and allegedly approved the transaction under attack"); Issuer v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp.
696, 699, 701 (D. Del. 1966) (suit dismissed where majority of directors is not "guilty of any
particular wrongdoing . . . or improper self interest" in the challenged transactions).
32 Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 291-92, 131 S.W. 340, 345 (1910); Syracuse
Television, Inc. v. Channel9 Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 194-95,273 N.Y.S.2d 16,25-26 (Sup.
Ct. 1966) (board ignored plaintiff's demand), rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 638, 280 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1967);
J.C.F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 181 Misc. 283, 286-87, 46 N.Y.S.2d 605, 60910 (Sup. Ct. 1943), ajf'd mem., 267 A.D. 863, 47 N. Y.S.2d 303 (1944); Koch v. Estes, 146 Misc. 249,
253-54, 262 N.Y.S. 23, 27-28 (Sup. Ct.), ajf'd mem., 240 A.D. 829, 266 N.Y.S. 1008 (1933), ajfd
mem., 264 N.Y. 480, 191 N.E. 525 (1934).
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courts have added that the court may inquire into the reasonableness of
the board's refusal to sue. 33
Moreover, the defects in board action cited by courts as sufficient
to permit a derivative suit are largely dicta, bearing little relation to the
facts.3 4 This increases the difficulty of determining where the courts
stand on many questions. For example, although only a few courts
have stated that a derivative suit may proceed if the board's refusal to
sue is alleged to be unreasonable, no court has expressly stated that
such an allegation is insufficient to permit the plaintiff to proceed.
Usually, the court gives only a general list of defects that does not include the unreasonableness of the directors' decision. 35 Moreover,
since plaintiffs rarely allege that the board's refusal was unreasonable,
the courts have seldom ruled on such an allegation. Thus, the applicability and scope of the business judgment rule in the context of refusals
to sue remain unsettled.
The duties of loyalty and due care, which the business judgment
rule incorporates, are themselves of uncertain scope. Although due
care is usally said, often in statutes, to import a "prudent man" or negligence standard, 36 it is clear that in practice courts rarely hold directors
liable for negligence alone. 37 Where a conflict of interest is involved,
however, courts scrutinize directors' acts much more carefully. This
has led some to state that the business judgment rule does not apply to
33 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979) (dictum); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,762 (3d Cir. 1974);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 US. 960 (1974) (court must
consider whether refusal by receiver was "justified"). See Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 102, Ill
So. 2d I, 5 (1959); Lazar v. Merchants' Nat'! Properties, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 235, 237, 256 N.Y.S.2d
514, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1964), ajf'd mem., 22 A.D.2d 253, 256 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1965); Markewich v.
Newberg, 27 Misc. 2d 1040, 1041, 210 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (Sup. Ct. 1960). q: United Copper Sec.
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,264 (1917) (Court stated that there was no "allegation that [the directors'] action in refusing to bring . . . suit [was] unwise."); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(factors "less compelling than bad faith" may suffice). But see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
34 See, e.g., Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,460 (1882), where the Court cited ultra
vires acts, fraud, illegal and oppressive acts or self-dealing by the majority as acts sufficient to
permit a derivative suit to proceed. Since the complaint in Hawes alleged no such acts, however,
the list is of limited value.
35 See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
36 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) ("that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances").
See generally H. HENN, supra note I, § 234. See also note 26 supra.
37 See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Jndemn!fication of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which directors of
industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by
self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in ·a very large haystack.").
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acts entailing conflicts of interest. 38 The statement is unnecessary,
though, because the rule requires compliance with the duty of loyalty
and thus, if applicable, requires the same careful scrutiny that courts
otherwise give to conflicts of interst.
A further problem is that the courts have rarely spelled out what
facts plaintiff must allege to make a sufficient pleading of the directors'
bad faith, lack of independence, or involvement or collusion in the
wrong, 39 nor have the courts indicated to what extent plaintiffs are entitled to discovery and a trial to unearth and prove the necessary facts.
No court has expressly denied that allegations of bias, collusion, bad
faith, or unreasonableness raise questions of fact. Yet, while a few
courts have stated that these allegations can be resolved only after discovery40 or only at trial, 41 others have dismissed complaints containing
such allegations for want of sufficient particularity. 42
In short, one can rarely predict what standard a court will apply
and how it will apply that standard to the question whether the board's
opposition warrants dismissal of a derivative suit against corporate insiders. One point is settled, however: even where a plaintiffs claims
are based on federal law, the effect of the board's refusal to sue generally will be determined by reference to state law. In Burks v. Lasker, 4 3
the Supreme Court held that the Investment Company Act of 194044
and the Investment Advisers Act of 194045 "did not require that States,
38 Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Gurde for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L REV. 562, 564 (1967).
39 It is not clear what facts plaintiff must allege to plead either acquiescence by the board in
the wrong or domination of the board by the wrongdoers. Apparently, a bare claim of acquiescence will not suffice. See Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952). Compare Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 220, 11 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1937) (domination of corporate
receiver sufficiently pleaded by allegations that he was a clerk in the office of the attorneys of the
alleged wrongdoers) with Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 701 (D. Del. 1966) (domination of
board not sufficiently pleaded by allegations that alleged wrongdoer, itself a corporation, was the
corporation's largest shareholder, with more than 12% of its stock, and had three of its employees
on the corporation's 17-member board). See also Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329
N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 506 (1975) (allegations of acquiescence held sufficient where
"based on formal action of the board in which the individual directors were participants"). See
also notes 226-27 infra.
40 Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592,
598 (S.D.N. Y. 1974) (permitting discovery only of matters "relating to the business judgment defense").
41 Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum) (summary judgment granted on other grounds). See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 150-52
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 759, 144
P. 2d 725, 731 (1944)
42 Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d
166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952).
43 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979).
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-52 (1976).
45 Jd. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21.
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or federal courts, absolutely forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous [derivative] actions." 46 Although the Court technically left open
on remand the question whether in this particular case federal law forbade such termination under state law, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion suggests that it does not. 47 If the Court finds the state law consistent with the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts,
which were intended to deal with the especially difficult problems of
conflicts of interest of investment advisers and directors of investment
companies, 48 probably it will also find the state law to be consistent
with most or all federallaw, 49 except federal laws expressly providing
for derivative suits. 5o

l

The Special Litigation Committee

I

i
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Although the courts generally have held that the board's refusal to
sue will not block a derivative suit naming a majority of the directors as
defendants, 51 a few corporations facing such actions recently have established committees of allegedly independent directors to investigate
the allegations of shareholders' complaints and have argued that the
decisions of such committees not to sue warrant dismissal of the derivative suits. Nearly all of these "special litigation committee" cases have
involved attacks on questionable payments. Such cases raise several
unusual issues, and thus may be of limited precedential value to other
kinds of derivative suits. 52 Nevertheless, acceptance of the corpora99 S. Ct. at 1841.
The Court stated that "Congress consciously chose to address the conflict of interest problem through the Act's independent directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies,"
and that "when Congress did intend to prevent board action from cutting off derivative suits, it
said so expressly." I d. at 1840. Justices Stewart and Powell, concurring, saw no "danger that state
law will conflict with federal policy," id. at 1842, although Justice Blackmun, concurring, stated
that such conflicts "could very well exist . . ." Id. at 1841.
4 8 Id. at 1838-39.
49 See Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding state law
permitting board termination of derivative suits consistent with rule lOb-5); Maldonado v. Flynn,
No. 77-3180, slip. op. at 8-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (finding board termination consistent with
Securities Exchange Act § 14(a)); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244-45 (D.
Minn. 1978) (distinguishing the Court of Appeals decision in Lasker and holding that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not preclude use of the business judgment rule to block a derivative suit), aff'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, !00 S. Ct. 670 (1980). But see Galef v.
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip. op. at 5920-21 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (finding board termination
inconsistent with Securities Exchange Act § 14(a) where all directors were defendants).
50 For example, state procedural obstacles to derivative suits (such as contemporaneous ownership and posting of security for expenses) often are held inapplicable to suits under§ 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976). See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1046 {2d ed. 1961); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1175 (4th ed. 1977).
Thus, courts will probably hold that the power of the board to terminate a§ 16(b) suit is governed
by federal law.
51 See note 31 supra.
52 See notes 169-74 and accompanying text infta.
46

47
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tions' arguments has disturbing implications.
One of the first cases to consider this argument, Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 53 is typical. In 1975 Exxon's board of directors established a
Special Committee on Litigation to investigate allegations by Gall and
others regarding questionable payments made by Exxon's Italian subsidiary and to determine whether the corporation should sue any of its
own or its subsidiary's officers or directors regarding such payments.s4
The con1mittee concluded that the president of the subsidiary had
made substantial unauthorized payments55 and that several directors of
Exxon named as defendants in Gall knew of the payments at the time
they were made. 56 The committee concluded, however, that it would
be detrimental to Exxon and its shareholders for Exxon, or anyone on
its behalf, to sue any Exxon director or officer, and the committee
therefore authorized Exxon's officers and general counsel to oppose all
derivative suits relating to the payments.57 The committee cited as reasons for its decision the poor prospects for success of the litigation, the
cost of conducting the litigation, the interruption of corporate affairs,
and the undermining of personnel morale. 5 8
Despite the committee's conclusions, several shareholders continued the suit against several Exxon directors. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint in reliance on the committee's decision. Although the court initially denied the motion, the denial was a pyrrhic
victory for plaintiffs. The court, holding that the matter was governed
by the business judgment rule, rejected all plaintiffs' arguments that the
use of the special committee was inherently defective59 and denied defendants' motion only for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs to conduct discovery to determine whether the committee members had acted
in bad faith or were involved or interested in the alleged wrongs. 60 After plaintiffs had conducted this limited discovery, the court granted the
53

418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. !976).

54 Jd. at 510-ll.
55 Jd. at 51!. The committee found that the unauthorized payments totaled at least $29 mil-

lion, plus $27.9 million in contributions to Italian political parties. The president of the subsidiary
maintained secret bank accounts to facilitate these payments.
56 Jd. at 512.
57 Jd. at 514.
58 Jd. at 514 n.l3.
59 Plaintiffs had argued that, since the full board of Exxon remained free to override the committee's resolution, the decision not to sue was in effect the decision of the full board, which was
dominated by the defendants, and that the refusal to sue amounted to an impermissible ratification of illegal acts. /d. at 516-17. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text infta. Moreover, the
court found "not a scintilla of evidence" that the Italian payments were in any way illegal. 418 F.
Supp. at 518-19. In light of the latter finding, the result in Gall may be correct, although the
court's path to that result is objectionable.
60 418 F. Supp. at 519-2!. The court also spoke of determining whether the committee members were "independent" but the court's opinion makes it clear that by independence the court
meant nothing more than an absence of involvement in the questionable payments. The court's
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renewed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaints. 61
In Auerbach v. Bennett, 62 the most important case on point to date,
the New York Court of Appeals ordered dismissal of a derivative suit
on the ground that a special litigation committee of disinterested directors had decided to terminate the suit and that the business judgment
rule placed this decision beyond judicial scrutiny so long as the committee had used appropriate "investigative methods." 63 The unusual
procedural sett1ng of the case leaves some doubt, however, as to the
scope of the court's holding.64
In other cases involving special litigation committees the courts
generally have followed Gall and Auerbach, holding that judicial scrutiny of the board's refusal to sue is limited by the business judgment
rule. 65 They have divided, however, on whether to permit discovery or
to dismiss without permitting even the limited discovery granted in
Gall. Dismissal often has been premised on the plaintiffs failure to
plead the bad faith or lack of independence of the committee. 66 Allater opinion followed this definition of independence. Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op.
at 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977).
61 Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977).
62 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
63 /d. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
6 4 The plaintiff did not appeal dismissal by the trial court. Another shareholder then intervened and prosecuted the appeaL The intervenor, however, was saddled with Auerbach's complaint, the allegations of which were weak on the issues of the committee's Jack of independence
and the inadequacy of the committee's investigation.
65 Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn,
No. 77-3180 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979);
Rosengarten v. International Tel & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Parkoffv. General TeL & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y.
App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.
1980); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at II, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Auerbach v.
Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.LJ.,
Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see Jamieson v. Jamieson, N.Y.LJ., June 23, 1976,
at 8, col. I (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d
875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (Sup. Ct. 1977) (business judgment rule is not conclusive on issue of excessiveness of executive compensation). Contra, Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18,
1980), discussed in note 254 infra. Cf Galef v. Alexander, No. 79-7166 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980)
(business judgment rule does not apply where all directors are named as defendants).
66 See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978) (summary
judgment granted where plaintiff conceded good faith and independence of committee), o/fd, 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, JOO S. Ct. 670 (1980); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op.
at 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (summary judgment granted where complaint failed to challenge disinterestedness or independence of committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (summary judgment ordered where plaintiff raised no question of independence of or adequacy of investigation by committee); Auerbach v. Aldrich,
N.Y.LJ., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff
alleged no fraud or self-dealing by committee members). q. Bennett v. Instrument Systems
Corp., 66 A.D.2d 708, 411 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978) (nonmanagement directors' affidavits of
nondomination warranted summary judgment where plaintiff offered no controverting evidence).
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though the courts seem to agree that such a pleading entitles the plaintiff to at least limited discovery, several courts have adopted, without
much consideration, a narrow concept of what constitutes a lack of independence, most indicating that only active involvement in the alleged wrongs negates independence. 67 Except in Auerbach, there has
been little discussion of what constitutes an adequate investigation by
the noninterested directors; 68 nor have the courts discussed the burden
of proof as to independence, although it seems that the burden has
But see Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(summary judgment granted following earlier postponement pending deposition of committee
members); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. I 172, I 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting discovery on issue
of independence of directors), 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment after discovery), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. I978), rev'd, 99
S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 2, (Sup. Ct.
1977). See also Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979) (limited discovery
granted as to "validity and propriety" of board's resolution adopted on committee's recommendation); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, !980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. !980) (discovery limited to issues of committee's "good faith and independence"); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J.,
May 9, 1978, at I l, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (discovery permitted as to good faith and independence
of the committee); Jamieson v. Jamieson, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1976, at 8, col. l (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (1977) (trial
court denied motion to dismiss pending "total disclosure"; appellate court reversed for stay pending disposition of similar complaint in Gall).
67 See Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,!53 (9th Cir. 1979) (court approved
of presence on committee of one director, even though he was named as a defendant for having
acquiesced in the transaction in question, because he did not profit therefrom); Maldonado v.
Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip. op. at 15-!6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (committee member held independent although he was a partner with committee's special counsel); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp .• 466 F. Supp. 8!7, 825 (S.D.N.Y. !979) (court held two outside directors
disinterested as to suit challenging questionable payments, even though one was a defendant and
the other a potential defendant in their capacities as directors for other corporations that had
made questionable payments); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.
1977). q. Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op. at 4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977) (plaintiff
must show directors "were either personally involved . . . or at least sufficiently interested in" the
alleged wrongs); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 927 (1979) (no triable issue as to independence of directors who were not on board and had
no affiliation with corporation at time of alleged wrongs). But if. Wallenstein v. Warner,
N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at II, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (possible knowledge of wrongdoing by committee member raised question as to his independence). See also Abbey v. Control Data Corp.. 460
F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978), ajj'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
670 ( !980) (plaintiff conceded committee's independence).
68 The court in Auerbach held that courts may inquire into the directors' selection of investigative procedures, but rna y not, absent a showing of bad faith, inquire into the directors' weighing of
factors after the conclusion of the investigation. Since the complaint did not challenge the adequacy of the investigation, however, summary judgment was appropriate on this point. Auerbach
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633-34, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928-29. (1979). See
also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3!80, slip op. at 20-21 (S.D.N. Y. Jan. 24, !980) (following
Auerbach); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (court found investigation adequate, though not without flaws); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978), ajj'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 670 (1980) (plaintiff conceded adequacy of committee's investigation).
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been placed on the plaintiff to prove a want of independence. 69
Summary and Implications

The special litigation committee cases may presage the demise of
the derivative suit. When faced with a derivative suit, defendant directors will invariably request an investigation and decision by some fellow directors as to whether the suit is in the best interests of the
corporation. The defendants have nothing to lose in so doing-at
worst, the nonimplicated directors will decide to take over the suit, or
to take a neutral stance toward the suit, leaving the defendants no
worse off than when they started. More important, the prospect of such
a decision is minimal; almost invariably, the directors charged with the
decision decide to oppose the suit.7° In most cases, this opposition will
result in dismissal of the suit unless the deciding directors are shown to
be directly implicated in the alleged wrong or are so clumsy as to be
found to have acted in bad faith. 71 Such opposition can even block
plaintiffs discovery as to defendants' alleged misdeeds.n
It is doubtful whether the shareholders' derivative suit deserves the
sudden interment it is being given.7 3 At the very least, pronouncement
of this death sentence by the courts constitutes unjustifiable judicial
legislation. More shocking is that the courts have neither offered a rationale for condemning the derivative suit nor even acknowledged that
they have condemned it. One hQpes that the courts simply do not realize that they are endangering the derivative suit and that once they do
realize it they will act quickly to reverse the trend by significantly restricting the board's power to terminate derivative suits.
PROPOSED STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

When, if ever, should the· decision not to sue, made by the full
board of directors or a special litigation committee of supposedly disinterested directors, serve to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit?
Clearly, not every derivative suit should be allowed to proceed in the
face of the board's opposition. Even a meritorious suit may produce
significant litigation costs for the corporation, diversion of corporate
employees, detriment to personnel morale, and adverse publicity far
outweighing any benefit that might be derived from a judgment in behalf of the corporation. 74 If the suit is groundless, the cost to the corpo69

See note 184 infra.
Although there are no statistics available, there are many reported cases where the directors
have refused to sue after receiving a demand. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 26-29 & 43-58 supra.
In no case known to the author have the directors agreed to sue.
71
See notes 25, 59, 62 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
72
See notes 60-6 I & 66 and accompanying text supra.
73
See note 3 supra.
74
See generally text accompanying n~tes I62-64 & 232-40 infra.
70
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ration is incurred without any compensating benefit, and is often
compounded by the necessary indemnification of the defendants for attorneys' fees. 75
Yet, the existence of some suits that should not be brought does
not mean that directors should be able to terminate all derivative suits
at will. The importance of derivative suits in protecting minority shareholders from abuses by corporate insiders has been well-documented.76
The courts have recognized that the very insiders accused of injuring
the corporation cannot be expected to sue themselves, and thus have
held that the refusal of the full board to sue a majority of its members
does not bar a derivative suit. 77 There are also good reasons for a court
to be skeptical even where the refusal to sue is made by a committee of
supposedly disinterested directors.
Both inside and outside directors and their counsel are subject to
heavy pressures not to take steps adverse to their fellow directors.7B
Even genuinely independent directors cannot be expected to investigate
alleged wrongs by their colleagues with the zeal of a plaintiffs attorney
motivated by the prospect of receiving a large fee if he is successfu1_79
Where the corporation may have been injured by persons unaffiliated
with the corporation, however, the directors can be expected to weigh
dispassionately the merits of a suit to seek redress. Accordingly, the
board should be able to terminate suits against unaffiliated persons
subject only to compliance with the business judgment rule, but the
board should never be able to block a derivative suit in which a majority of the directors is implicated. Moreover, where any derivative suit
implicates a minority of the directors or other insiders, board opposition to the suit should not lead to dismissal unless the court is satisfied
after weighing several factors that dismissal is appropriate.
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Suits Implicating a Majority o.f the Directors

Where a majority of the directors is implicated in a wrong alleged
in a derivative suit, a refusal to sue by either the full board or a committee established by the full board should never block the suit.
Neither the directors nor outside counsel can be truly independent in
such cases. Moreover, the shareholders have a right to something more
than an objective investigation by disinterested persons.
75 Indemnity of a director or officer who defends a derivative suit with some success is often
required or permitted by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW§§ 721-727 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-1980); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 380. Corporate
by-laws and charters and employment agreements often provide for indemnification where per·
mitted by law. See id. § 379.
76 See note 3 supra.
77 See note 31 supra.
78 See text accompanying notes 80-115 i'!fra.
79 See text accompanying notes 116-29 i'!fra.
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Independence if the Directors.-When charges are leveled against
a majority of the directors, the pressures on even nonimplicated directors are so great as to justify a conclusive presumption that they cannot
independently investigate and weigh the facts and reach a conclusion
that is in the best interest of the corporation. This presumption is supported both by scholarly analyses of dire~tors' behavior_ and b~ comparisons to other areas of the law where mdependence IS reqmred of
those who sit in judgment of others.
Most apparent is the probable lack of independence of inside directors-those who are also officers of the corporation. If the defendants in the derivative suit include his superior officers, the inside
director cannot be expected to act independently; the same officers
whom he is to judge will determine his future salary, fringe benefits,
and promotions. 80 Even if the defendants are subordinates of the inside director, his investigation will not likely be dispassionate. Corporate officers cannot run a business effectively without the cooperation of
lower level managers, 81 and a decision to sue a subordinate could well
undermine the cooperation of lower officers generally by instilling fear
that upper management will not be loyal to them. Furthermore, an
inside director's decision to sue subordinate officers could raise embarrassing questions, and the prospect of liability, with respect to his selection and supervision of subordinates. 82
The independence of outside directors also may be compromised
in many ways. The selection of outside directors is usually controlled
by the senior management of the corporation, 83 which seeks to name
80 M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 144-45 (1976); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 119-20 (1971); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board o/ Directors: Fond Hope-Fain/ Promise? 76 MICH. L. REv. 581, 584 (1978). See Leech & Mundheim,
The Outside Director if the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799, 1803-04 (1976).
81 Indeed, it is sometimes posited that effective power in the corporation "is lodged deeply in
the technical, planning and other specialized staff," and that interference with the technocracy by
higher management creates serious problems. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 69
(1967).
82
Officers and directors may be held liable for negligence in selecting or supervising corporate
agents or employees. H. HENN, supra note I,§ 234, at 456. See generally 3A W. FL~TCHER, supra
note 14, §§ I 065-1100.
83
Often the chief executive officer nominates new outside directors. HEIDRJCK & STRUGGLES,
l~c., THE CHANGING BOARD 8 (1977) (in 46.5% of 1,000 corporations surveyed, the chief execuhve officer is "the initial decisionmaker regarding a prospective director"). See also C. BROWN,
PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 28 (1976); M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146; M.
MAcE, supra note 80, at 94, 108; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1233-34 ( 1977);
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; Soderquist, Toward a More Ejfeclive Corporate Board·
Reexamining Roles o/ Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1341, 1350 (1977). Cf Wharton
School of Finance and Co=erce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1962) (independent directors of mutual funds are selected by the controlling management
group). It is widely recognized that, absent exceptional circumstances, nomination is tantamount
to election. C. BROWN, supra, at 23; Weiss & Schwartz, Disclosure Approach for Directors, 56
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individuals who will not "rock the boat." 84 Most outside directors
share similar social and professional backgrounds and general attitudes
with their inside director colleagues. 85 Most are themselves corporate
executives, 86 often with firms that do business with the corporation,s?
and thus are unlikely to look favorably on shareholder interference
with management generally, or on derivative suits seeking to foist liability on corporate directors. 88 Outside directors are often friends of
high executives in the corporation before becoming directors, 89 and
even if not, friendships among directors naturally grow during their
tenures on the board. Furthermore, the outside director is indebted to
his fellow directors for the income and prestige he derives from his
position,. and he depends on those same directors for the continued re-

.

.

HARV. Bus. REv. 18, 24 (Jan.-Feb. 1978). Management control of nominations is reduced when,
as is_ becoming more common, the nomination of new directors is handled by a committee of
outside directors, but even in these cases the committee is likely to bow to management's suggestions. Solomon, supra note 80, at 605-06. At the very least, the chief executive officer usually has
a tacit veto power over new nominations. Coffee, supra, at 1233. But see "Independent" Panels of
Corporate Baards to Tap New Directors Are Prol(ferating, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 12, coL 2
(citing view that nominating committees will bring "a more objective approach to director selection, which will result in more independent directors and decisions").
84 M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146. Accord, M. MACE, supra note 80, at 99, 108; Leech &
Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1826-27; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584-85. See also Nutt, A Study
o_f Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 219 (1971) ("[A] reasonable man
... will not join a board [of a mutual fund] if he knows that he cannot support the existing fundadviser relationship . . . .").
85 Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24. See Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside Directors;
52 HARV. Bus. REV. 70,71 (July-Aug. 1974). See generally G. DoMHOFF, THE BOHEMIAN GROVE
AND OTHER RETREATS (1974); G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES (1970).
86 J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF THE
BoARD 29, 39 (1973); M. MACE, supra note 80, at 87, 96-97, 106; Nutt, supra note 84, at 217;
Soderquist, supra note 83, at !350-51; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 & n.l3; Weiss & Schwartz,
supra note 83, at 24.
87 Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11 (1972); Solomon, supra note 80, at
590. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; CJ. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146
("approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the outside directors . . . are lawyers or investment
bankers," most of whom "are suppliers of services to the corporation"). But see Lubin, Outsiders
In: Firms Adding More Independent Directors But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches, Wall
St. J., May 26, 1978, at 38, coL 1 (stating that recently fewer outside directors have been "quasiinsiders").
88 See Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 & n.l3. But if. Rosengarten v. International TeL & Tel.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held two outside directors disinterested as to
suit challenging questionable payments even though one was a defendant and the other a potential defendant in their capacities as directors for other corporations that had made questionable
payments).
89 M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146; M. MACE, supra note 80, at 95, 97-100; Solomon,
supra note 80, at 584-85. See J. BACON, supra note 86, at 28 & Table 4. But if Corporate Rights
and Responsibt1ities: Hearings Bifore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 140
(1976) (statement of Richard M. Cyert) ("[r]ecruitment [of new directors] is not a question of the
president getting his friends on the board") [hereinafter cited as Corporate Rights Hearings]. See
also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1831
(1979).
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ceipt of these benefits. 9o
Both inside and outside directors are discouraged from independence by pressures to conform, sometimes referred to as "groupthink."9I The pressure to conform is great enough in ordinary matters
of corporate planning, where board rejection of a management proposal would produce nothing more than annoyance. 92 The pressure is
much more onerous when the directors are asked to subject a fellow
director to a suit that could lead to major financial liability, loss of job,
and public humiliation. 93 When a minority of directors is asked to sue
the majority, the pressure may be unbearable. 94 Abstention by or
recusal of the interested directors does not solve the problem. 95 Al90 Selection of outside directors by management inspires feelings of loyalty to management
among the directors so selected. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146-47; Moscow, supra note 87,
at 11. If feelings of loyalty are inadequate to the purpose, the chief executive officer's power over
renomination of incumbents may do the trick. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 147; Leech &
Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; Solomon, supra note 80, at 605-06. See also HEIDRICK &
STRUGGLES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BoARD OF DIRECTORS )) (1971) (nearly 37% of corporations
surveyed reported "firing" directors). But if M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 147 n.40 (noting
ambiguity in this statistic).
9I See Coffee, supra note 83, at 1233-34. But see Corporate Rights Hearings, supra note 89, at
!40. At the very least, the clubby atmosphere and traditional etiquette of the corporate boardroom undermine any inclination toward independence. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 52, 54; Soderquist, supra note 83, at 1361 n.J20.
.
92 Outside directors who oppose management may be told that such behavior is "inappropriate" or may be asked to resign. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 80. Usually the board will not act
until a problem has reached crisis proportions. Jd. at 41; Solomon, supra note 80, at 583. SeeM.
EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 140-41, 170; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 n.l3, 585; Weiss &
Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24.
93 See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct.
1831 (1979), where the court of appeals said, "It is asking too much of human nature to expect that
the disinterested directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in
a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerned." See also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 750 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
Even where the issue is not a suit against directors but dissatisfaction with the chief executive
officer, the directors usually keep silent or resign. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 33-36. See Weiss &
Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24.
94 See Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), whe.re t.he court
stated:
The court should not cajole itself into believing that the members of a Board of Directors
elected by the dominant and accused majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing
h~ve been made, were selected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the
mmority stockholders and to assure a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the
offending majority. Where we know that puppet directors would at best only go through the
motions, are we barred from considering who would be manipulating the wires?
95 See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1965), cerl. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28
(1966), where Judge Hays said in dissent: "No one who knows anything about the conduct of
~orporate enterprise considers that the major stockholders' withdrawal from the room when a vote
Is taken amounts to anything more than an empty ceremonial." See also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 n.2 (2d Cir.) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane) (majority opinion by Hays, J.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
·
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though most studies confronting the problem of lack of independen
among corporate directors have recommended approaches to producece
more independent board, 96 it has been questioned whether any of the a
recommendations can succeed. 97 For present purposes, however su~~
recommendations are superfluous: if minority directors cannot dispas.
sionately decide whether to sue the majority, the solution is to allow th
derivativ:e suit to proceed and let a court decide the case on its merits.9;
The inherent conflict of interest that arises when directors are
asked to pass judgment on fell?w directors has been t_acit~y recognized
by statutes and case law regardmg other aspects of denvatlve suits. For
example, although most state statutes provide mechanisms for board
resolution of matters in which some directors are interested,99 the
courts have nonetheless relieved the shareholder of the burden of making a demand on the board before commencing a derivative suit implicating a majority of the board. 100 The courts have recognized that such
a demand would be pointless since no action by the independent directors could be considered determinative of whether the derivative suit
should proceed. 101 Similarly, in many derivative suits the courts have
insisted that the corporation appear by independent counsel, or even
96 See C. BROWN, supra note 83, at 33 (arguing that the chief executive officer should be the
only inside director); M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 175-76 (suggesting a majority of independent directors who also control proxy machinery); Coffee, supra note 83, at 1234 (stressing independent nominating committee); Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830 (emphasizing
independent nominating committee); Moscow, supra note 87, at 11-12 (suggesting random selection from list of eligible directors); Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of
Directors, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 63, 99 (1977) (advocating greater disclosure of directors'
backgrounds and activities).
97 See generally Solomon, note 80 supra.
98 The author's present purpose is not to question the efficacy of outside directors, although
others have raised such questions. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 140-41; Solomon, supra note
80, at 6 !0 & n.l23. Even if one concedes that outside directors can often be effective, it is too
much to expect them to be genuinely independent and disinterested in deciding whether their
colleagues should be sued.
99 The mechanisms include delegation of board powers to a committee, see Note, Executive
Committees-Creation, Procedures, and Authoril)', 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42, 42 n.4 (1967) (list of
such state statutes), and empowering the noninterested directors to act for the board even if they
do not otherwise constitute a quorum, see, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW§ 713 (McKinney 1963).
100 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
101 q. Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978) (possibility that
interested directors might disqualify themselves did not justify requiring demand on board with
two interested and two noninterested directors). It would create an awkward, if not anomalous,
situation if, in a suit against a majority of the directors, the plaintiff did not have to make a
demand on the board, but the noninterested minority directors could subsequently terminate the
suit. If cases like Gall are to be followed, it would seem logical to require a demand on the board
in all derivative suits. See Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979)
(complaint dismissed for failure to make demand on board where board had established a litigation committee).
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that the corporation take a neutral stand on the suit. 102 Here again, the
courts' decisions would make no sense if the board could simply establish an allegedly disinterested committee to determine which position
counsel should take on a derivative suit. Where the suit involves transactions between a corporation and its insiders, the courts have insisted
that even the approval of noninterested directors does not render careful judicial scrutiny of the fairness of the transactions unnecessary. 103
In considering whether a minority of directors can be sufficiently
independent to weigh a suit against the majority, useful perspective
may be gained from the standards of disinterestedness required of triers
of law and fact in judicial and arbitral proceedings. Because bias is so
hard to prove 104 and because it is essential that the judicial resolution
of disputes be fair not only in fact but also in appearance, the law often
disqualifies from certain roles in the dispute resolution process anyone
who has an apparent conflict of interest in the dispute, even though his
integrity is unimpeachable. A judge must recuse himself sua sponte
whenever his impartiality might be reasonably questioned, 105 or on the
102 Although the corporation must be a nominal defendant in a derivative suit, the suit is nonetheless brought on its behalf and it stands to benefit from any judgment for plaintiff. The question
· arises whether the corporation may interpose defenses to the action. There is little helpful authority on this point. N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 109, at 435. See generally Washington, Stockholders'
Derivative Suits: The Company's Role, and a Suggestion, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 361 (1940). A f~<w
cases have held that the corporation may not interpose any defense. Meyers v. Smith, 190 Minn.
157, 159,251 N.W. 20,21 (1933) (per curiam); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616,626,61
A. 1061, 1064-65 (1905). Others have permitted the corporation to interpose defenses when its
interests lie in resisting the suit. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (E.D.
Pa. 1944), ajf'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 181
A.D. 75, 78, 168 N.Y.S. 251,254 (1917) (dictum), ajf'dmem., 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 908 (1920). It
has been suggested that the corporation be permitted to interpose defenses designed to protect the
corporation, but not those designed to protect the alleged wrongdoers. 66 HARV. L. REV. 342
(1952). See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5997. Of course, the line between the two types of
defenses is very hazy.
·
A related question is whether the corporation and the alleged wrongdoers may be represented
by the same counsel. See generally Tockman, The Position of Corporate Counsel in .Derivative
Actions, 51 ILL B.J. 654, 659-60 (1963); Note, Independent Representation for Corporate .Defendants in .Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.J. 524 (1965). Some courts have held that they may. Otis &
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E. D. Pa. 1944), ajf'dper curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d
Cir. 1946); Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 278-79, 72 A.2d 294, 299 (1950). Others have held
that they may not. Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213-20 (N.D. Ill.
1975), mod!fied on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F.
Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Langer v. Garay, 30 A.D.2d 942, 293 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968) (per
curiam); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 A.D.2d 760,760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (1959) (per
curiam).
103 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text infra.
104 See Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (although majority
appeared disinterested, demand on board excused because "tangible indications of bias on the
part of the unaffiliated majority are rarely present"); Greene v. Allen, 35 Del. Ch. 242, 114 A.2d
916, 920 (1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (near impossibility of proving bad faith with respect to a subjective evaluation).
105
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) requires the judge to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his
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motion of a party a~eging facts suggesting part~ality, ~ven_if the judge
feels the suggestiOn 1s unwarranted. 106 Even fnendship w1th an interested nonparty has been held sufficient to mandate recusal. 107 Simi.
larly, a juror may be disqualified for cause if he has an interest in the
case or has any substantial connection, such as an employment relationship, with any party. 108 Comparable rules apply to arbitration 109
and administrative proceedings. 110
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," or where he has a personal bias. Semble, ABA
CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(l). A judge must also recuse himself when he has even
a small financial interest in the case, including ownership of stock in a party-corporation. In re
Honolulu Canso!. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917). Semble, ABA CoDE OF JuDICIAL CoNDUCT, Canon 3(C)(l)(c). By comparison, the impartiality of a committee member owning stock in
the corporation is surely open to question; the committee member's compensation as a director
usually exceeds his monetary interest as a stockholder, thus clearly suggesting bias in favor of the
accused directors who control that compensation. And even though his interest as a stockholder
might give the director an identity of interest with the plaintiff-shareholder, it should be noted that
a judge must recuse himself for financial interest even if the presumably injured party does not
request it.
106 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976). If the movant's affidavit gives "fair support to the charge of a bent
of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment," the judge must recuse himself
regardless of the truth of the allegations. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-35 (1921);
United States v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 715, 717-18 (D. Del. 1976), a.lf'd mem., 566 F.2d 1171 (3d
Cir. 1977). See also CAL. C1v. PRoc. CODE§ 170.6 (West Supp. 1979).
107 United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.W. Va. 1976).
108 See State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 383, 151 S.E.2d 308, 320 (1966) (a master or servant of,
or anyone who is "of the same society or corporation with," a party should be disqualified) (quoting as dictum State v. Dushman, 79 W.Va. 747,91 S.E. 809 (1917)). See also Henslee v. State, 251
Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971) (under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1920 (Rep!. 1964) employee of
plaintiff-corporation was properly dismissed); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Langdon, 187 Colo. 425, 532
P.2d 337 (1975) (en bane) (under CoLO. R. C1v. P. 47(e)(3), an employee may be challenged for
cause); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 207 S.E.2d 543 (1974).
109 Arbitration proceedings require the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality. See
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968); American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 405, 148 N.E. 562, 564 (1925) ("An arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial proceeding and should possess the judicial qualifications of fairness to
both parties . . . .");Labor Relations Section ofN.N.Y. Builders Exch. Inc. v. Gordon, 41 A.D.2d
25, 27, 341 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1973). See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION§ 21.01-04 (1968).
Federal and state arbitration laws require modifying or vacating awards by biased arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976); N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 75ll(b)(l)(ii) (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT.
ANN.§ 298.10(l)(b) (West 1958).
'
Regular business dealings with a party will disqualify an arbitrator. J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
Rytex Corp., 41 A.D.2d 15, 18, 340 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (1973), qff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 123, 312 N.E.2d
466, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974); Petroleum Cargo Carriers Ltd. v. Unitas, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 222, 226,
220 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1961), qff'd mem., 15 A.D.2d 735, 224 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1962).
110 Due process requires trial by an impartial tribunal in an adminstrative proceeding.
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975). The rules governing disqualification for bias and
interest apply equally to courts and administrative agencies. See B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW§§ 106-109 (1976). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT§§ 12.01-.04, 12.06
(3d ed. 1972). Section 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. § 556(b) (1976), provides a disqualification procedure similar to that for federal judges discussed in notes 105 & 106
supra. See B. ScHWARTZ, supra, § 109. Even a fairly remote financial interest in the case will
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A corporate board considering whether or not to bring suit is, concededly, in a somewhat different position than a judge, jury, arbitrator,
or administrative tribunal resolving a dispute. The board must weigh
not only the legal rights of the parties but also the total costs of the
litigation to the corporation. 111 Nonetheless, the fact and appearance
of impartiality are important not only to the particular corporation but
to the entire corporate governance system. To ensure both the fact and
the appearance of impartiality, the nonimplicated minority of directors
should be presumed to have a conflict of interest and should not be
permitted to act as judge and jury in deciding whether a derivative suit
should proceed against a majority of their fellow directors.
Perhaps nonimplicated directors should not even be asked to
weigh a suit against their colleagues. Two problems are evident. First,
if the nonimplicated directors believe the accused directors guilty of
serious wrongs to the corporation, they are, as a practical matter, constrained to ask the accused directors to resign from all corporate posts,
and the accused directors might feel it only honorable to acquiesce.
This action may, as a practical matter, be irreversible, for even if the
accused directors are ultimately vindicated in a derivative suit, it might
be awkward to return them to their corporate positions. Therefore,
.since a suit against their colleagues is such a destructive weapon,
nonimplicated directors might decline to use it absent overwhelming
evidence of grave wrongdoing. Second, since outside directors are supposed to be watchdogs to management, using them to shield management from shareholder suits is of questionable propriety. 112 These
problems are easily solved by allowing a derivative suit to proceed.
The nonimplicated directors could then await disposition of the suit to
decide whether the accused directors should resign. This lesser
weapon, the derivative suit, is not so destructive as to make its use unthinkable, so it also retains its deterrent value.

Independence of Special Counsel.for the Minority Directors.-Midirectorsoften are nonlawyers who have other principal occupations and little regular staff support. Often, therefore, they have neither
the time nor the resources to conduct a thorough investigation· of the
ch~rges raised by a derivative suit. As a result, a key role in the investigation must be played by special outside counsel 113 to the minority di~ority

disqualify one from adjudicating an administrative proceeding. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
578:79 (1973) (licensed optometrists held barred from adjudicating license revocation proceedings
a?amst other optometrists on grounds that license revocation might increase business for the adjudicators).
III See text accompanying notes 232-40 i'!fra.
2
Il See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1211 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979).
II3 0 rd"man"1y, m
. d epen dent counsel means counsel other than the corporatiOn's
.
house counsel
or regular outside counsel, who are too financially dependent on the board to be disinterested.
See Bishop, supra note 37 at 1080.
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rectors. 114 Yet, even outside counsel may not be truly disinterested and
effective. For example, the directors may select counsel with a reputation for indulgence toward accused directors, a reputation gained
through lax investigations that curry favor with directors and enhance
the counsel's prospects of being retained for similar future assignments
by the same and other corporations. In short, counsel's self-interest
may color his investigation and lead him to recommend against suing
any director. 115
The Shareholders' Perspective .-In addition to disinterested decisionmakers, the Anglo-American legal system features adversary proceedings .in which key roles are played by persons who clearly are not
disinterested-the parties to the dispute and their attorneys. 116 It is believed that the truth is more likely to emerge if each party, aided by
skilled counsel, is free to advance his own case and to attack his opponent's case vigorously. 117 In theory, and to a large extent in practice,
shareholders receive the benefits of an adversary proceeding in a derivative suit. Although the interest of the nominal plaintiff in the outcome
is usually minimal, the interest of his attorney in receiving a generous
court award of attorneys' fees, usually from the fund created by a settlement or judgment in favor of the corporation, generally assures
shareholders of vigorous and competent representation. 118 Moreover,
114

See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y.

1979).
115 Professor Bishop has stated well the problems of relying on theoretically independent counsel with respect to indemnification of directors and officers:
No one need question the honesty of these darlings of corporate draftsmen: the problem
rather is that those who choose them are pretty sure to favor a lawyer who was acquired in
the course of a corporate practice a sympathetic understanding of the problems of corporate
management. It is not easy for even a lawyer of the most rugged integrity to be harsh to
people who were responsible for his retainer. But in fact counsel may well be a regular associate and friend of the defendants: "independent" may turn out to mean nothing more than
he is not an employee of the corporation.
Bishop, supra note 37, at 1080 (footnote omitted). On at least one occasion independent counsel
failed to convey to the board information he had obtained regarding illegal payments. Robertson,
The Directors Woke Up Too Late at Gulf, FORTUNE, June, 1976, at 124. See also Coffee, supra
note 83, at 1127-28 (describing cases where outside counsel was lethargic in conducting investigations of reported wrongdoing).
116 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[A] common law
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding."). See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4 (2d ed. 1977). For criticism of the adversary system, see Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975). See also F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra, § 1.2, at 7; Rosenberg, The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000, 74 CASE &
CoM. 3, 10 (1969). Much of the criticism has focused on the assumption that all parties will be
represented by equally skillful counsel.
117 F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 1.2, at 5; A. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION I (1956). The moral acceptability
of decisions is also enhanced when judges are not involved in initiating and conducting the case.
See F. JAMES&. G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 1.2, at 5.
118 The motivation for the suit is usually the hope of attorneys' fees. Smolowe v. Delendo
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the power of the court to disapprove settlements and discontinuances 119
helps ensure that plaintiff and his counsel will not agree to a disposition
of the case that places their own interests ahead of those of the shareholders.120
When a derivative suit is dismissed due to the opposition of the
board of directors, the benefits of an adversary proceeding are lost to
the shareholders. No plaintiff presents himself to press the interests of
the shareholders; special counsel to the directors is charged not with
advocating the shareholders' interests but with being fair and objective;
and the special counsel's fee does not depend on, and therefore is not
an incentive for, procuring a settlement or judgment in favor of the
shareholders. 121 Shareholders are entitled to be represented by one
who has a strong incentive to ferret out all evidence of wrongdoing.
Unfortunately, although plaintiffs attorney in a derivative suit has
such an incentive, he may have little incentive to consider the cost to
the corporation of protracted litigation. In other words, plaintiffs attorney has little reason to consider whether it is in the best interests of
the corporation, and of its shareholders generally, to proceed with the
derivative suit. On balance, however, this problem is less serious than
the potential for a biased decision by minority directors to oppose the
suit.I22
Shareholders may not fare much better where the decision not to
sue is rendered by a special litigation committee created by the board.
In many if not all states, the full board, which by hypothesis the alleged
wrongdoers dominate, may dissolve or overrule the committee. 123 The
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (referring to suits under
§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 114, at 448. To encourage effort by plaintiffs' attorneys, awards of attorneys' fees for successful plaintiffs have usually been generous. See W. CARY, supra note I, at 980-82. As to the competence of plaintiffs'
lawyers, see Note, Security.for Expenses in Shareholders' .Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 59 (1968).
119 As to the requirement of court approval of settlements and discontinuances, see notes 20910 and accompanying text in.fra.
·
120 See Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996 & n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965);
Craftsman Fin. & Mort. Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); H. HENN, supra note
I,§ 375, at 790; Haudek, supra note I, at 768-71. See also note 211 iqfra.
121 Indeed, counsel is likely to have a strong interest in conducting the investigation in such a
way that the directors will decide to oppose any derivative suit. See note 115 and accompanying
text supra.
122 See text accompanying notes 232-40 in.fra.
123 Several states expressly provide that the committee shall serve at the pleasure of the board,
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.63(c)
(Anderson 1978), or that a majority of the full board may "abolish any such committee at its
pleasure," N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-9(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979-1980), or that the committee shall be
subject to the direction and control of the board, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4)(8) (West Supp.
1979). See also 7 F. WHITE, NEW YORK CORPORATIONS~ 712.03 (13th ed. 1979); note 125 iq/ra.
Where statute does not grant and the full board has not expressly reserved such power, it is unclear whether the board may dissolve or overrule a committee. Several courts have held that,
119
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alleged wrongdoers thus occupy an enviable position. If the committee
decides against suit, the accused directors may raise that decision as
grounds for dismissal of a subsequent derivative suit, but if the committee chooses to sue or appears to be leaning in that direction, the
board can simply overrule or disband the committee. In Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 124 the court rejected plaintiff's argument that, for these reasons,
the litigation committee proceeding should not raise a valid defense.
The court seemed to assume that the board could not dissolve or overrule the committee, although the court cited no authority for this other
than Exxon's by-laws and the wrong part of a New Jersey statute.l2s
The danger is not purely hypothetical: in at least one case, a corporate
board did dissolve a committee that seemed to be taking its job seriously.126
The investigation conducted by theoretically disinterested directors has other shortcomings from the shareholders' perspective-notably, the inability to compel testimony under oath or the production of
documents pursuant to court-supervised discovery. Although information may be obtainable from employees of the corporation, such information rnay not be sufficient to determine whether to sue. Full
discovery is vital to the development of any case against corporate directors, and the inability of disinterested directors to compel testimony
or the production of documents raises a suspicion that their investigation may not adequately protect the interests of shareholders, even
where the directors proceed energetically.
Reliance on a decision by supposedly disinterested directors also
deprives shareholders of the opportunity to persuade a court to modify
existing law and the right to appeal adverse decisions on questions of
law. While the plaintiff in a derivative suit can argue that the court
notwithstanding the literal language of the relevant statutes, the board is limited in the powers it
can delegate to a committee. See Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co., 181 F. 289 (1st Cir.
1910); Note, Executive Committees-Creation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42,
59-63 (1967). One commentator has suggested that because the committee is created by the board
to assist in managmement, "there should be no question that the board may control the executive
committee." /d. at 47.
124 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a description of the case, see notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
125 418 F. Supp. at 516-17. The court quoted N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-9(1) (West 1969), which
generally empowers corporate boards to delegate to a committee "all the authority of the board"
with certain exceptions. The court overlooked or ignored subsection (2) of§ 14A:6-9, which empowers the board to "(c) abolish any such committee at its pleasure; and (d) remove any director
from membership on such committee at any time, with or without cause." Thus, the Exxon board
could have dissolved the committee before it reached any decision. See Maldonado v. Flynn, No.
77-3180, slip op. at 14a (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (apparently concluding that committee's decision
was not subject to board review). As to whether the board could overrule a decision of the committee, see note 123 supra.
126 See Zale Consents to SEC Order Requiring 3 New Directors, Revamped Audit Panel, Wall St.
J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 8, col. l.
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should expand existing doctrines of liability to include the allegedly
wrongful behavior of the defendants, the directors' investigation and
decision will probably only consider existing law. Directors certainly
cannot be expected to expand the scope of directors' (and thus their
own) fiduciary duties. It also seems unreasonable to measure the directors' decision solely against the standard of good faith when the decision of a trial judge is subject to a much tougher standard of appellate
review.
A useful analogy can be drawn from the treatment of "interested
transactions" between a corporation and one or more of its officers or
directors. The prevailing view is that even where such a transaction is
approved by a majority of disinterested directors the court will subject
the transaction "to rigid and careful scrutiny, and [will] invalidate the
contract if it [is] found to be unfair to the corporation." 127 Even where
the statutory language read literally suggests that approval by a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders is sufficient by itself, courts
and commentators have insisted that the court review the transaction
for faimess. 128 This approach reflects a sage recognition that directors
are placed in an awkward position when asked to pass on the fairness
127 Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict o/ Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW.
35, 43 (1966). See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (rigorous scrutiny of director's claim
against bankrupt corporation); Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 854, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392,
406-07 (1965); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chern. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (1952);
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 282-83, 166 N.E.2d 793, 799-801 (1960);
Abeles v. Adams Eng'r Co., 35 N.J. 411,428-29, 173 A.2d 246,255 (1961); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett,
293 N.Y. 442, 460-61, 57 N.E.2d 825, 834 (1944) (court reviewed transaction for fairness even
though the directors' "good faith is established"); La Vin v. La Vin, 283 A.D. 809, 810, 128
N.Y.S.2d 518, 519, tifl'dper curiam, 307 N.Y. 790, 121 N.E.2d 620 (1954); H. HENN, supra note I,
§ 238, at 467; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 80, at 291. A few states still adhere to the old view that
such a transaction is voidable even if fair and approved by a majority of disinterested directors.
Cathedral'Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying Connecticut law); Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 833, 29 So. 2d 653, 655 (1947); H. HENN, supra note
I,§ 238, at 466 & n.4; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 80, at 291 n.67. On the other hand, a few cases
require plaintiff to show not only unfairness but also fraud or bad faith. R HENN, supra note I,
§ 238, at 466 & n.5. The transaction will receive especially careful scrutiny if the intere~ted directors have substantial influence with the corporation. See note 149 infra.
128
Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974); Kennerson v. Burbank
Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d !57, 170, 260 P.2d 823, 831-32 (1953); Remillard Brick Co. v.
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); Fliegler v. Lawrence,
36! A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 238, at 468 n.IO & 469; N. LATTIN, supra
note 3, § 80, at 292; Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Some Aspects qfthe New Jersey, New York
and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 627-28 (1969); Comment, "Interested Director's"
Contracts-Section 713 o/ the New York Business Corporation Law and the "Fairness" Test, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 648 (1973), and authorities cited therein;.,J6 BUFFALO L. REV. 840, 841-43
(1967), and authorities cited therein. See also Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 494-95 (3d Cir.
1976) (under Delaware law, intrinsic fairness test applied where defendants controlled corporation); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 278 N.E.2d 642, 646, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 437
(1972) (dictum). q: Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693,695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (business judgment rule
applied where defendants did not control corporation).
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of transactions from which their colleagues stand to profit, and that the
courts must be prepared to step in and protect shareholders from unfair
transactions. 129 The director who must decide whether to sue his colleagues is placed in an even more awkward position. In such cases the
courts should be even quicker to intervene to defend shareholders by
subjecting the alleged wrongs to "rigid and careful scrutiny." In sum
e~~n where the nonimplicated directors and th~ir coun_sel are genuinely
dlSlnterested, there are strong reasons for findmg a duectors' decision
to oppose a derivative suit inadequate to justify dismissal of the suit.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the board should never be able
to terminate a derivative suit against a majority of its members. One
could argue alternatively that, in such a case, a court should conduct a
preliminary hearing and, after weighing all relevant factors, 130 decide
whether continuation of the derivative suit will serve the interests of the
corporation and of justice. On balance, however, this approach seems
unwise. Such a hearing would add to the expense and delay of the suit.
Moreover, the independence of the noninteiested directors and their
counsel-a key issue in any such hearing-·is exceedingly difficult to
prove or to disprove. 131 Finally, termination of shareholder litigation
at the behest of a minority of directors, even after a court hearing,
would fuel cynicism among stockholders and the general public.m
One could overlook these problems if there were a substantial
probability that the hearing would terminate the suit. There is little
likelihood, however, that minority directors could demonstrate the high
degree of independence and care that would merit dismissal of the suit.
Accordingly, a per se rule that bars a minority of board members from
·
terminating suits against a majority of directors is preferable.

Suits Implicating a Minority

of Directors

Although the board should never be able to terminate a derivative
suit against a majority of its members, it should be able to terminate a
129 See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 606 (1875) ("[T]he remaining
directors are placed in the embarrassing and invidious position of having to pass upon, scrutinize
and check the transactions and accounts of one of their own body, with whom they are associated
on terms of equality.in the general management of all the affairs of the corporation."); Munson v.
Syracuse, G. & C. Ry .• !03 N.Y. 53, 74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886) ("The law cannot accurately
measure the influence of a trustee with his associates, nor will it enter into the inquiry . . . .");
Marsh, supra note 127, at 37-38. Cf Greene v. Allen, 35 Del. Ch. 242, 249, 114 A.2d 916, 920
(1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup.
Ct. 1956) (court barred insider from seizing a business opportunity that the corporation had rejected because of difficulty of determining whether insider had influenced board to reject that
opportunity).
130 See text accompanying notes 136-91 ilifra, proposing such an approach for suits against a
minority of the directors.
13 I See note I04 supra.
132 See note 243 i'!fra.
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suit against a minority of directors or nondirector officers in some
cases. The pressures on nonimplicated directors are not always as great
in the latter cases, and certain factors may weigh in favor of termination.
One major factor weighing in favor of termination of the derivative suit is the harm the corporation may suffer from litigation ostensibly brought on its behalf. Although the corporation usually is not an
active participant in shareholder litigation, it may incur substantial
costs in complying with demands for documents and depositions.
Moreover, the litigation may divert the attention of management and
undermine the morale of corporate personnel. 133 Even if the derivative
suit produces a recovery for the corporation, it may be outweighed by
these costs. These considerations suggest that in some cases the court
should be able to curtail derivative suits because they are not in the best
interests of the corporation.
The pressures against the independence of nonimplicated directors
may be much weaker in some cases than in others. Consider, for purposes of illustration, a continuum of situations generating different degrees of pressure. At one end would be a suit for self-dealing against
all directors, including the senior officers and controlling stockholders
of the company, where the accused board selects two lower corporate
officers as new members and places them on a committee to determine
whether the suit should proceed. At the other end of the continuum
would be a derivative suit against a single lower level officer and director for acting beyond the scope of his authority. In the first situation,
the argument against allowing the committee to terminate the suit is
overwhelming. In the second situation, however, a court might well
give serious credence to the board's conclusion that the suit was not in
the best interests of the corporation.
A line is needed to distinguish cases warranting a per se treatment
from those in which board action may warrant dismissal. Although
any line drawn for this purpose must be somewhat arbitrary, drawing
the line between suits against a majority of directors and suits against a
minority has much to recommend it. A majority can select a committee
of members deemed likely to reach a favorable result, dissolve or overrule the committee, and threaten not to renominate directors who will
not cooperate. A minority of directors may be unable to do any of
these things. 134 Fear of publicity adverse to the corporation may weigh
133

See notes 162-64, 203-05, & 232-36 and accompanying text infra.
In the large public corporation a majority of the board can usually control the future composition of the board by controlling the proxy machinery. See W. CARY, supra note I, at 229-31.
It has been suggested that control lies or could lie with the nominating committee. See Coffee,
supra note 83, at 1232-34. Generally, though, statutes permit the full board to dissolve or overrule
a committee. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra. Also, the nominating committee
often bows to the wishes of the chief executive officer. See notes 90-92 supra.
134
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less heavily on the nonimplicated directors when a smaller number of
directors is involved in the suit. Outside counsel will have less reason
to curry favor with or be intimidated by the alleged wrongdoers if they
are only a minority of the board. Termination of a derivative suit is
more likely to be accepted as fair by shareholders and the general public if effected by a noninterested majority of the board. Moreover
courts have long drawn a line at this point with respect to both th~
effect of a refusal to sue and the necessity of a demand on the board.IJs
Finally, distinguishing between suits against a majority and suits
against a minority of the board creates a bright-line test that facilitates
the planning of the parties and better avoids lengthy and costly preliminary skirmishing than a less easily applied test, such as one based on
whether the alleged wrongdoers dominate the board or the corporation.136

A Weighing-if-Factors Approach.-Although the dangers of bias
are less when only a minority of directors or nondirector officers are
named in a derivative suit, there are still substantial pressures placed
on the nonimplicated directors and their special counsel, and there is
good reason to question whether the investigation by the nonimplicated
directors is adequate to justify dismissal of the derivative suit. Rather
than apply a per se rule that, without any inquiry, either dismisses the
derivative suit or allows it to proceed, the court should conduct a careful inquiry and dismiss the suit only if it is persuaded, after plaintiff has
had sufficient opportunity to develop his case, that the nonimplicated
directors are reasonably independent, have conducted an adequate investigation, and have articulated cogent reasons why the derivative suit
should not proceed.
Independence .-Although the courts recognize that directors must
be independent of the alleged wrongdoers if their refusal to sue is to
thwart a derivative suit, 137 the courts often have assumed that the directors are independent unless plaintiff presents clear evidence of bias. 138
As previously discussed, this assumption is unwarranted. 139 How then
See notes 18, 19, & 31 supra.
See notes 147-49 and accompanying text infra.
137 See note 31 supra.
138 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979) (" 'disinterest' is defined as lack
of any financial stake ... in the transaction"); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966)
(domination of board not sufficiently pleaded by allegations that alleged wrongdoer was the corporation's largest shareholder, owning more than 12% of its stock, and had three of its employees
on the corporation's 17-member board); Coffee, supra note 83, at 1229-30. In cases involving
special litigation committees, several courts have adopted narrow concepts of what constitutes a
lack of independence, see note 67 supra, and seem to have placed the burden of proof as to
independence on the plaintiff, see note 184 i'!fra.
139 See text accompanying notes 80-112 supra.
135

136
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should a court determine in a particular case whether nonimplicated
directors are reasonably independent?
To be considered independent, a director must not be named as a
defendant in the derivative suit or implicated in the alleged wrong.
These are the minimum requisites of independence. A court may also
consider whether each director's past performance on corporate boards
has shown evidence of real independence. Evidence that a director
who opposed suing a fellow director had often voted against that director on other matters would support a claim of independence. On the
other hand, where a director has no history of opposing fellow directors, even on matters where their personal finances were not at stake,
some courts have held it unrealistic to expect him to act independently
in a matter that might result in serious liability for his fellow directors.l4o
Although outside as well as inside directors are subject to pressures on their independence, the pressures on inside directors are
greater, 141 and courts should be especially skeptical of their claims of
independence. Even directors who are not corporate officers, and thus
not inside directors, may be so closely connected to management that
their independence should be doubted. Family ties, business or professional dealings with the corporation, 142 or a web of interlocking directorates143 can seriously compromise a director's independence. It has
been suggested that such directors be deemed "affiliated." 144 Courts
140 De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (lOth Cir. 1970). See also Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 8
A.D.2d 310, 316-17, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 71-72 (1959) (board found not independent where it was
advised by officer of dominant shareholder and "[h]is advice was uniformly followed"), ajfd, 8
N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960). It might be argued that it is unreasonable
to ask whether a director has dissented on prior board votes because nearly all board resolutions
are adopted unanimously. This argument, however, only tends to underscore the lack of independence of most directors.
14 1 See notes 80-96 and accompanying text supra.
142 "Family ties, business or other professional arrangements may not disqualify one from
serving as a director, but such an individual cannot be held out as an 'outside director.' " Report
of the Fifty-Second American Assembly, The Ethics of Corporate Conduct 5 (Harriman, N.Y.)
(Apr. 14-17, 1977). See also Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830-31. It is not unusual for a
board to include relatives of officers, retired executives of the corporation, outside counsel for the
corporation, or investment bankers, commercial bankers, or suppliers who do business with the.
corporation. See note 87 supra. But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1979)
(partner for corporation's regular outside counsel held a legally disinterested director as to transaction in which he had no direct financial interest).
143
See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 183 I.
144
Professors Weiss and Schwartz would label a director "affiliated" if he has recently engaged
in or proposes to engage in material transactions with the corporation, if he has close family ties
With a corporate officer, or if any officer of the corporation sits on the board of a corporation of
Which the director is an officer. Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 83, at 20. The SEC dropped a
proposed amendment of Schedule 14A that would have required labeling many such directors as
"affiliated non-management," but, in a note to Item 6(b) of the Schedule, stated that any attempt
125
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should be equally skeptical regarding claims of independence by b0t
affiliated directors and inside directors.
If a committee is established to investigate charges against dire
tors, it should be composed exclusively of nonaffiliated, nonimplicat c
directors, 145 and should, if possible, be selected solely by nonaffiliate~
nonimplicated directors so as to reduce the possibility that the accuse
directors will fi~l the committee with directors from whom they expe~;
the greatest leruency.I46
Nonimplicated directors' claims of independence should also be
greeted with skepticism where the derivative suit names dominant
stockholders or officers as defendants. In such cases, a majority of the
board may feel no more free to act independently than would a minority in a suit against a majority of the board. 147 Such cases should therefore be treated like suits against a majority of the board. One problem
with this is that it is often difficult to identify the controlling persons of
large corporations. 148 The percentage of stock owned is not always determinative of working control, for in a widely held company the
holder of even a small percentage may have effective control. 14 9 Furthermore, in many cases control is not absolutely lodged in a single
person, institution, or cohesive group, but is divided among several. If
the defendants in a derivative suit own a substantial amount of stock,
the court should seek other indicia of control. Although no easy, foolproof formula is available for determining control, numerous statutes
and common law doctrines address the concept of corporate control,
and the factors weighed by courts and administrative agencies in other
matters involving determinations of corporate control should be useful
by the issuer to label such directors "independent" might be materially misleading. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,766.
145 The reported opinions involving litigation committees generally have not indicated whether
the committees have included inside directors. Although most probably have been composed
solely of outside directors, in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), one committee member was a senior vice president of Exxon. /d. at 510 n.2.
146 It does not appear in the cases involving litigation committees that the accused directors
have recused themselves from the selection of the committee.
147 The courts have recognized this by holding that a demand on the board is unnecessary and
that the board's refusal to sue will not thwart a derivative suit if the defendants, though not comprising a majority of the board, otherwise dominate the board or the corporation. See note 19
supra.

148 W. CARY, supra note I, at 230.
149 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (rev. ed.
1967); 2 L. Loss, supra note 50, at 770. Courts have also held that a transaction between a corporation and a director must be scrutinized more carefully if the director has substantial influence
with the corporation. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489-91, 121 N.E.
378, 379-80 (1918) (Cardozo, J.). See Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 8 A.D.2d
310, 317, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 72 (1959), ajf'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289
(1960).
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in derivative suits as well. 150 The factors considered should include the
amount of stock held by the persons in question, the number of their
representatives on the board, their demonstrated influence, the corporate offices they hold, and their strategic position on executive and
nominating committees. 151 Power to direct the corporate proxy machinery should suffice to show control, but lack of such power should
not necessarily prove an absence of control. 15 2
Even if the defendants do not do1r..inate or control the corporation

.

they may be able to influence the board if they are high-level officers,
integral members of the management team. Such influence is especially likely when the board is composed largely of the defendants' fellow officers. If corporations adopt the suggestions of some
commentators that insiders be virtually eliminated from the board, 153
perhaps it will become unnecessary to assume some influence by insiders over the board, but until such time a court should consider such
influence a strong possibility.
Only if the foregoing factors point strongly toward the independence of those directors who have decided not to sue should the court
consider dismissing the derivative suit. Because bias is so difficult to
prove or disprove, the inquiry will be a difficult one. Nevertheless, the
inquiry is inescapable unless a per se rule is to govern all such cases.
In investigating charges brought in a derivative suit, the nonimplicated directors will usually require the assistance of counsel. 154 Although it is doubtful whether any counsel paid by the corporation can
be truly disinterested, 155 certain steps can be taken to assure some degree of independence. First, counsel should not be the corporation's
~ouse counsel or regular outside counsel: both have close and continumg ties with management that would subvert their independence. 156
Second, to help ensure that counsel does not favor defendants in order
to curry favor with management in the hope of receiving future business from the corporation, it should be agreed that counsel will not be
ret~ined again by the corporation for some substantial period of time.
Thrrd, to help ensure that counsel neither has nor tries to develop a
reputation for leniency in such cases among other potential corporate
15

°

For example, the concept of control plays a key role in the statutes administered by the
Securities and Exchange Co=ission. 2 L. Loss, supra note 50, at 764-70.
151
/d. at 778-83.
·
152
/d. at 779.
153
For example, SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams has suggested that the chief executive
officer should be the only inside director on the board. Speech by Harold Williams to the Americ~ Assembly IS (Columbia University, Apr. 16, I977). Accord, C. BROWN, supra note 83, at 33.
54
See note II4 and accompanying text supra.
155
See text accompanying notes I 13-I5 supra.
1 6
~ For this reason courts have often insisted that the corporation appear by independent counsel mad·
· smt.
· ..."'ee text accompanymg
· note I 02 supra.
envahve
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clients, 157 it would be preferable to retain a reputable firm that often
represents plaintiffs as well as defendants in derivative suits. Such
counsel would be less concerned about its reputation among corporations and also more experienced in conducting the kind of aggressive
inquiry that would be desirable. Finally, if special counsel is to be selected after a derivative suit has commenced, the nonimplicated directors should consult with plaintiffs as to the selection of counsel.

Adequacy of the Investigation.-It would make a mockery of justice if supposedly disinterested directors could terminate a derivative
suit after a sham investigation of the alleged wrongdoing. Clearly, a
court. must determine whether directors have conducted an adequate
investigation.
To be consistent with the business judgment rule, the investigation
must at least have been conducted with due care, that is, with the care
and skill that a reasonably prudent and competent person would exercise under similar circumstances. 158 The business judgment rule, however, is intended to apply to suits seeking to hold the directors liable for
injury to the corporation, and perhaps to suits to compel or enjoin certain acts by the directors; the rule need not be applied to cases dealing
with the effect of a refusal to sue on a derivative suit. 159 Such cases
demand a more stringent standard. Since the purpose of the derivative
suit is to vindicate the rights of the corporation and, indirectly, of the
shareholders, the court should permit the suit to proceed at least to the
discovery stage if the directors failed to pursue any line o.f inquiry that
probably would have led to material evidence incriminating the defendants. Any lesser standard would free the way for inadequate investigations and leave the corporation and its shareholders without
remedy for a probable injury. Such a result cannot be justified by the
policy underlying the business judgment rule-the absolution of directors from liability for mere errors of judgment--or by any other sound
policy.
Failure to pursue a line of inquiry does not necessarily intimate
any fault or negligence on the part of directors or their counsel. For
example, the directors' efforts may be frustrated by inability to compel
the submission of evidence or to threaten punishment for perjury. If a
due care standard were followed, an investigation could be deemed adequate despite the inability of the directors to compel submission of
crucial evidence. The prospect of such a result argues further for the
application of a more stringent test.
A standard requiring the directors to have pursued every probably
material line of inquiry is somewhat vague, but no more so than other
157
158
159
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See text accompanying note 24 supra.
See text accompanying notes 192-95 i'!fra.
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standards applied by the courts or than a due care standard under the
business judgment rule. More difficult than the vagueness problem is
the problem of how the plaintiff can show that the investigation has
overlooked a promising line of inquiry. This problem will be discussed
below.160

Cogency if the Explanation.-One crucial issue is to what extent a
court should review the reasons given by nonimplicated directors for
opposing a derivative suit. Reasons tending to support a decision not
to sue do not necessarily support a decision to oppose a derivative suit.
For example, in Gall v. Exxon Corp. 161 the reasons cited by the committee included "the unfavorable prospects for success of the litigation
[and] the cost of conducting the litigation." 162 Although these might be
persuasive reasons for declining to sue, they would not justify opposing
a derivative suit where the plaintiff-shareholder assumes the cost of litigation and the risk of an unfavorable decision. Similarly, the costs of
the suit to the corporation should be irrelevant to the extent that the
plaintiff is required to post security for the corporation's expenses, 163 or
where the corporation has waived the right to demand such security.
The directors should be required to describe with particularity the
facts and assumptions underlying each reason for their decision to oppose the derivative suit. For example, a claim that the suit would interrupt corporate business affairs or undermine personnel morale 164
should not be taken at face value as sufficient grounds for stopping a
derivative suit: lawsuits always interrupt the affairs of the parties and
undermine the morale of those threatened with liability. The directors
should be required to show that the interruption of business and the
undermining of morale would be substantially greater than that which
ordinarily attends involvement in litigation, and great enough to harm
substantially the business of the corporation. The court should realize
~hat large corporations are continually embroiled in litigation and that
m most instances the costs of involvement in even a major suit are insignificant in comparison to the corporation's assets and revenues. In
160 See text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
16 1 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
162 /d. at 514 n.l3. See also Rosengarten v. International Tel. &

Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817,
822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 626,393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 923 ( 1979).
163 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 627 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See generally H. HENN,
supra note I, § 372. The expenses for which security must be posted include the expenses of other
defendants indemnifiable by the corporation and, generally, include attorneys' fees. Jd. at 782-83
& n.S.
_164 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508,514 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), .where the committee·
Cited "interruption of corporate business affairs" as one reason for its decision. See also Ga1ef v.
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5902 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980), and Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 773180, slip op. at 20 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (citing adverse effects on employee morale).
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general, since there can be no precise formula to weigh the cogency of
the reasons for the directors' decision not to sue, a judgment as to the
adequacy of these reasons will rest largely in the discretion of the trial
judge, and the judge should not hesitate to require more than a cursory
showing by the board.

Nature of the Alleged Wrong.-Since courts generally have not
permitted the vote of a majority of shareholders to ratify a fraudulent
illegal, or ultra vires act, 165 it should follow that directors, who presum~
ably represent the shareholders, should not be permitted to decline to
sue when the corporation is injured by such an act, for a refusal to sue
has the same effect as a ratification: to shelter the act from judicial
scrutiny. 166 The courts usually have held, however, that a refusal to sue
does not amount to a ratification. 167 Nonetheless, it might be appropriate for the courts to consider the nature of the wrong in deciding
whether the board should be able to thwart a derivative suit against a
minority of the directors. Courts should be more reluctant to dismiss
complaints of wrongs that would be nonratifiable. 168 Perhaps more important, courts should be more reluctant to dismiss claims alleging selfdealing or some other breach of the duty of loyalty than to dismiss
other kinds of claims.
The alleged wrongs in many of the recently decided cases involving litigation committees have concerned questionable payments,l69 in
165 Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 315-17 (3d Cir. 1962). See Mayer v. Adams, 37
Del. Ch. 298, 303-05, 141 A.2d 458, 461-62 ( 1958). See generally H. HENN, supra note 1, § 194;
Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited Judicial Review, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1086 (1963); HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 762; Comment, Shareholder Validation of Directors' Frauds: The Non-ratification Rule v. the Business Judgment Rule, 58
Nw. U.L. REV. 807 (1964).
166 See Coffee, supra note 83, at 1222-23.
167 Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508, 517-18 & n.l8 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judgment granted for defendants},
rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Findley v.
Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 177, 240 P.2d 421, 428 (1952); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v.
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 110-11, 93 N.E.2d 241, 247 (1956). But see
Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 303-04, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (1958); Syracuse Television, Inc. v.
Channel9 Syracuse, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 246, 275 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 638,
280 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1967).
168 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) (no termination by board
where suit alleges self-dealing). But see Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 11, 17-18
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (application of the business judgment rule does not depend on the nature
of the alleged offense).
169 Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670
(1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v.
Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d
994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Wechsler v. Exxon Corp ..
55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (1977); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col.
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many cases made exclusively in foreign countries. 170 Defendants have
usually argued successfully that such payments, even if unethical, violated no foreign or American laws. 171 At the very least the courts in
these cases may have been reluctant to hold defendants liable for acts
that, when performed, were widely accepted in the business community
and from which the defendants realized no personal gain, especially
since the corporations in question had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of questionable payments. 172 The unpopularity of recent federal
legislation proscribing such payments 173 and doubt as to the wisdom of
attacking questionable payments by means of derivative suits 174 may
have been unarticulated reasons for judicial hostility to these suits.
When more serious wrongs are alleged, however, courts should consider distinguishing dismissals of suits alleging nothing more serious
than questionable payments.
The Stage o/ the Derivative Suzi'.-Several of the factors discussed
above, including the independence of the nonimplicated directors and
of special counsel, the adequacy of the investigation, and the reasons
for the refusal to sue, entail issues of fact. The plaintiff, who often must
commence his suit with little information, will not possess the relevant
facts at the outset. Indeed, most of the relevant information will be in
the hands of the defendants and of the corporation which, by hypothesis, opposes the suit. To what extent should plaintiff be entitled to discovery or a trial before the court decides a motion to dismiss based on
the corporation's refusal to sue? The cases are hopelessly inconsistent
on this question, with some courts permitting full trials, some full discovery, some limited discovery, and some no discovery. 175 •
6 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1977). For a description of
Gall v. Exxon Corp. see notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
The term "questionable payments" encompasses bribes, kickbacks, illegal political contributions, and sometimes legal political contributions as well. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 819 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
17
0 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
171 fd. at 518-19.
172
See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (court held that committee properly considered that suit served no deterrent purpose because of corrective steps already taken).
173
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 forbids such payments even in foreign countries.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. II 1978). This legislation has been condemned by many commentators. See Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Reform, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB.
3, 12 n.3 (1977). The Carter Administration has also shown interest in limiting it. See Taubman,
Carter Unit Recommends Easing o/ Bribery Law, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1979, at DI, col. I.
174
Even if such questionable payments should be illegal, derivative suits against those who
make such payments may not be the best method of dealing with them. For one thing, the paymentsdo not benefit those who make them, but are intended to benefit the corporation and probably often do so. See Coffee, supra note 83, at I 105-06.
175
See notes 40-42 & 66 supra.
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If the relevant test is whether the directors who refused to sue are
not implicated in the suit and have conducted a reasonable investigation, little discovery by the plaintiff should be necessary. The plaintiff
should be able to establish by simple depositions or interrogatories
whether the directors have any connection with the suit, and the record
of the investigation itself should indicate whether the directors conducted more than a sham investigation. If a court applies the business
judgment rule, however, more substantial discovery-perhaps full discovery on all relevant issues-is appropriate, since it cannot be determined whether the nonimplicated directors have acted with due loyalty
and care without some inquiry into the merits of the case. If the ultimate question is whether the nonimplicated directors have adequately
protected the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, the
plaintiff-sharehoider generally should be permitted to conduct thorough discovery before the court will entertain a motion for summary
judgment. Until the plaintiff has conducted such discovery it cannot be
ascertained whether the directors have ferreted out all significant evidence of wrongdoing and whether there is factual support for the directors' decision not to sue.
To permit the plaintiff full discovery, however, may defeat the corporation's purpose in opposing the suit. Even if dismissal is granted
after discovery and before trial, the corporation may suffer significant
costs, disruption, and personnel morale problems attendant upon litigation during discovery. Nonetheless, to allow the plaintiff full discovery
is the preferable approach. Many courts have held that summary judgment should rarely be granted against the plaintiff in a derivative suit
before he 'has had an opportunity for discovery. 176 To follow the approach in Gall v. Exxon Corp. 177 of allowing plaintiff's discovery only
for purposes of ascertaining the good faith and independence (apparently narrowly defined) of the litigation co~ittee members may deny
the corporation and its sharehplders a remedy where the directors have
not conducted a reasonably chreful investigation.· Even a reasonable
care standard can leave the corporation remediless where evidence incriminating the defendants goes undetected because of limitations
placed on the plaintiff's discovery. Such results cannot be countenanced.
If the directors' investigation has been conducted with reasonable
skill, the additional costs, disruption, and personnel morale problems
of the corporation resulting from plaintiff's discovery should not be excessive. Parties are limited to the discovery of relevant, nonprivileged
matter, 178 and protective orders 179 can prevent the plaintiff from need-

le

176 See Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cerl. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969), and authorities cited therein.
177 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
.
178 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 6.3, at 180. Ordt-
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lessly plowing the same ground already tilled by the nonimplicated directors.180 Thus, plaintiff's discovery can and should be limited to
relevant matter overlooked by the nonimplicated directors. The burden of this additional discovery should not be unreasonable in light of
the benefits of derivative suits 181 and of the cynicism that would be
bred if plaintiffs were not permitted to delve into charges of serious
wrongs by corporate directors. 182
Once discovery has been completed, a hearing will usually be necessary to resolve questions of fact. It has been suggested that a separate
trial be held on the corporation's motion to dismiss based on the directors' refusal to sue. 183 On occasion such a separate trial may save the
court and the parties time, trouble, and money, but in general it probably will not. To determine whether the nonimplicated directors are
completely independent of the defendants and have conducted a thorough investigation exploring all probably fruitful lines of inquiry, it
will be necessary to delve deeply into the same kinds of questions that
constitute the merits of the case. To hold a separate trial as to the effect
of the refusal to sue might save little time or money and would often
waste much of both.
Burdens o.fProo.f.-The courts have not paid much attention to the
issue of who bears the burden of proof on such questions as the independence of the directors and the adequacy of their investigation, but
they sometimes seem to imply that the plaintiff bears this burden. 184
The courts often state that the directors are assumed to have acted in
good faith and with due care. 185 Perhaps this assumption is justified
when directors are sued for a breach of duty; otherwise, a plaintiff
narily, documents produced in the directors' investigation would be discoverable. Any assertion
of a privilege to prevent such discovery should be deemed highly prejudicial to the corporation's
motion to dismiss.
179 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 6.13, at 206-07. If the
reluctance of courts to protect corporations from excessive, vexatious discovery in derivative suits
makes such suits unreasonably expensive, reform efforts should deal directly with this reluctance
rather than attempting t'o empower the directors, who cannot be completely disinterested, to terminate the suit.
180 Since the directors' investigation will not have been conducted under oath", it would be
necessary to have witnesses swear to the accuracy of statements made to the directors.
t 8 l See note 3 supra.
182 See text accompanying notes 241-44 infta.
183 CHICAGO Comment, supra note 17, at 198-200.
184 See Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other graunds, 567
F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op. at
4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977) (plaintiff must show directors' lack of independence); Falkenberg v.
Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff has burden of showing bad
faith, fraud, or improper investigation). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800, slip op. at 24
(Del. Ch. Mar. 18, l980).(dictum) (defendants have burden of proving independence).
185 See Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 {Del. 1960); ·E. FoLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW 76 {1972).
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could by bare allegations cast upon the directors the burden of provin
the propriety of each of their acts. Where the issue is the soundness ~1
a decision not to sue, however, all relevant considerations suggest that
the corporation should bear the burden of proof. First, the burden of
proof is often placed on the party having better access to the relevant
facts, 186 and the nonimplicated directors have access to the information
relevant to proof of their independence, the independence of their special counsel, and the adequacy of their investigation. Second, the corporation has the burden of pleading the directors' refusal to sue as a
defense and therefore usually would have the burden of proving that
defense. 187 Third, the burden should be placed on the corporation as
the party contending "that the more unusual event has occurred,"l88
for, in light of the numerous studies showing the pressures on directors
to conform and the general lack of independence among directors, 189 it
would be more unusual for the directors to be genuinely independent
and to conduct a rigorous investigation than for the contrary to be true.
Furthermore, the corporation has much greater resources than the
plaintiff and thus can bear the burden more easily. Finally, since the
question regarding the effect of the refusal to sue is only whether to
dismiss or to permit plaintiff to proceed to a determination of the merits-a determination as to which the plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proofl 90-it seems appropriate to cast the burden of proof on the
corporation as movant so as to favor a full hearing on the merits.l91
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED STANDARDS

A number of criticisms may be leveled at the standards proposed
186 See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 337, at 787 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940).
187 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, at 785. q. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(c) (requiring defen!fant
to plead affirmative defenses). But see Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(district court treated refusal to sue as raising not an affirmative defense but, rather, the issue of
plaintiffs standing to sue), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct.
1831 (1979). q. Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979) (also
treating refusal as raising issue of standing, but for purpose of right to jury trial).
188 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 787.
189 See notes 80-93 and accompanying text supra.
190 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 786 (burden of proof usually is allocated lo
the plaintiff, who seeks to change the status quo). q. H. HENN, supra note I,§ 234, at 457 & n.30
(burden is ordinarily on plaintiff to prove breach of duty of due care). Yet, the burden often has
been placed on defendants to prove the fairness of interested transactions. See, e.g., Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599
(1921); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (!955);
notes 127-29 supra.
191 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 786, 789 (burden of proof is sometimes allocated to party making "a disfavored contention" or a disfavored defense). Because dismissal deprives plaintiff and the shareholders of a hearing on the merits, a defense based on the directors'
refusal to sue could be deemed a disfavored defense.
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above for determining the effect of the board's refusal to sue. Although
some of these criticisms are well-founded, none is persuasive .
.Disregard of the Business Judgment Rule
It may be argued that the decision whether it is in the best interests
of the corporation to sue should be the province of those charged with
managing the corporation, namely, the board of directors. It may be
further argued that if such a decision is made in accordance with the
business judgment rule, that is, in good faith and with due care, that
decision should be. conclusive. This argument ignores the purpose of
the business judgment rule, which is not to ensure a correct result, but
to insulate from liability directors who have made mistaken decisions
resulting in corporate losses, notwithstanding their good faith and exercise of due care. Because the plaintiff in the derivative suit does not
seek to impose liability on the directors for their decision not to sue, the
business judgment rule is largely irrelevant in evaluating the directors'
decision. 192 Moreover, even to the extent that the business judgment
rule is relevant, experience shows that courts tend to misuse the rule in
derivative suits involving refusals to sue by applying it without sufficient inquiry. 193 This is reason enough to be skeptical of the utility of
the business judgment rule in this area.
The criticism that the proposed approach wrongfully disregards
the business judgment rule may be placed in a more useful perspective,
however, by considering the public policy underlying the rule and the
public policy implications of permitting directors to stop a derivative
suit. There are numerous salutary policy reasons for the rule. First, the
directors are hired to manage the corporation to the best of their ability, not to insure the success of the corporation, and it would be unfair
to treat them as insurers. Second, if directors were held liable for reasonable decisions that proved unsuccessful, competent persons would
either refuse to be directors or would become inordinately cautious in
managing the corporation so as to reduce the prospects of liability.
Third, the rule leaves governance of the corporation primarily to the
directors selected by the shareholders who own the corporation rather
than to a judge not selected by them. Finally, the rule promotes judicial economy by relieving the courts from involvement in complicated
business questions, unless the directors have breached a duty to the
corporation. 194 These policy reasons, however, do not generally war192
193

See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
See note 28 supra.
194
See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582F. 2d 259,274-75 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S: 1129 (1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions). Cf. Note, The Continuing Viability o/the Business Judgment Rule as a Guidefor Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 562, 565-66 (1967) (linking the rule historically to the doctrine of laissez-faire).
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rant dismissing a derivative suit on the basis of the directors' refusal to
sue, even when made with good faith and due care. Allowing the derivative suit to proceed despite the directors' opposition does not make
insurers of the directors, causing them to resign or become unduly cautious, because the derivative suit does not threaten them with liability
for refusing to sue. It also does not divide management and the board
of directors because the corporation remains officially opposed to the
suit. 195 Last, it does not involve the courts in questions of business policy, as opposed to questions of wrongs to the corporation, because the
corporation's policy remains undisturbed.
Even if permitting a derivative suit could be viewed as somehow
infringing. the principle of management by the directors, dismissing a
meritorious derivative suit would seriously infringe the principle of policing observance of the directors' co1 porate duties. This latter principle should be deemed more important because, without it, the directors
would be subject to no checks. In short, the business judgment rule is
either entirely consistent with the standards proposed herein or should
give way to the policies underlying those standards.

The "Rudderless" Corporation Objection
It has been objected that if nonimplicated directors cannot halt a
suit against a majority of the directors, then, in such situations, the corporation is left "rudderless," powerless to act on an important issue.196
This objection is largely specious. Within the proposed standards the
corporation retains the power to investigate alleged wrongs, to decide
whether to sue thereon, to join as a plaintiff and perhaps supersede the
derivative plaintiff if it does decide to sue, 197 to settle the dispute with
the true defendants, 198 to defend the suit actively if its interests are

195 See text accompanying notes 196-202 infra.
196 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip op. at 14a (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,928 (1979) ("To accept the
assertions of the intervenor and to disqualify the entire board would be to render the corporation
powerless to make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative
action."). See also Brief for Appellants Bennett, et al. at 20-21, Reply Brief at 10-11, Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
197 See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1039 (E. D. Pa. 1971); Silverman v.
Re, 194 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Lazar v. Merchants' Nat'! Properties, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 253,
254 N.Y.S.2d 712 (!964) (permitting corporation in good faith to take over derivative suit). But
see Palmer v. Morris, 341 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. !965); Generallnv. Corp. v. Addinsell, 255 A.D. 319,
7 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1938). See generally Haudek, supra note I, at 773-75.
198 Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (!965). The role of court
approval of such settlements is unclear. In Wolf the court held that court approval was not re·
qui red by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (now FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 ), but not all courts agree; in any case, a
court might insist on review of the settlement once it was pleaded as a defense in the derivative
action. See generally Haudek, The Selllemenl and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part II:
The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 8!3-16 (1969).
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threatened, I 99 and to advance the defendants their attorneys' fees pending disposition of the suit. 200 The only thing the corporation cannot do
is prevent a court from hearing charges of misconduct against its directors,. except where a minority of the directors is charged and the court is
satisfied after a careful weighing of all relevant factors that dismissal is
appropriate.
Under the proposed standards, the corporation is no more rudderless than it is in a suit challenging interested transactions-transactions between the corporation and its officers or directors. In that
situation, the courts will scrutinize the transactions for fairness even
though approved by disinterested directors because of the inevitable
pressure on disinterested directors to disregard the welfare of the corporation.20I Any costs and uncertainty resulting from a suit attacking
the interested transaction are thought warranted by the avoidance and
deterrence of transactions unfair to the corporation. The potential disruption of corporate planning would seem to be less in allowing derivative suits despite the directors' opposition than in allowing suits against
interested transactions. 202
Exposure to Strike Suits

Critics have often claimed that derivative suits are subject to abuse
by unscrupulous attorneys who take advantage of them to bring strike
suits203-that is, groundless nuisance suits brought not to benefit but to
extort a settlement from the corporation, which wants to avoid the expense and disruption of litigation. 204 A related problem has been private settlements of both groundless and meritorious derivative suits,
where the plaintiff may receive much more than the court award of
attorneys' fees he would have received by going to judgment. The corporation, for whose benefit the suit in theory was brought, not only
receives nothing, but also often pays the settlement, thus compounding
the initial wrong and resulting in "double looting."2os
Beginning in the 1940s, many state legislatures responded to these
abuses by enacting legislation regulating derivative suits. 206 This legisI99 See note 102 supra.
200

See H. HENN, supra note I, § 379, at 803.
See notes 127-29 supra.
202
A suit challenging an interested transaction roils corporate planning by making it uncertain
whether the transaction will be voided by the court. Most derivative suits seek damages for past

20 I

acts and thus do not hinder corporate planning.
203 See F. WOOD, N.Y. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS 112-15 (1944).
204
See H. HENN, supra note I, § 358, at 752 n.22; Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The
Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1934). .
205 H· BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS§ 152, at 363 & n.4 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, supra note I,
§ 374, at 789.

206

See A. CONARD, supra note 6, § 252, at 399-400; Hornstein, supra note 6, at 3-10.
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lation, however, often seemed to go so far beyond what was necessary
to curb the alleged abuses as to raise suspicions that its advocates
wanted to discourage meritorious derivative suits as well as to eliminate the abuses. 207 Professor Hornstein in particular argued persuasively that if the abuse was out-of-court settlements benefiting only the
plaintiffs attorney, the remedy was simply to bar settlements without
court approval; to burden derivative suits further would serve no legitimate purpose. 208
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure209 and most states 2 IO now
require court approval of settlements of derivative suits, thereby
prohibiting private settlements. 211 This requirement also helps to prevent strike suits, since a court would not approve the settlement of a
groundless suit to the benefit of the plaintiff and the loss of the corpora_
tion. 212 In a few jurisdictions statutes require the plaintiff to indemnify
the corporation and the defendants for their expenses if the court finds
that the action was brought without reasonable cause. 213 Thus, the possible profit from strike suits may be far outweighed by the costs of
bringing such suits. 214 Certainly, the possibility of nuisance suits
brought for their settlement value would seem to be greater in many
nonderivative civil suits where plaintiff (and his attorney) keep the entire recovery and do not need court approval of a settlement. Moreover, if the corporation does encounter what it believes to be a
groundless strike suit, there are many steps it can take to protect itSee note 6 supra.
Hornstein, supra note 6, at 3.
209 FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 provides that "[t]he action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court . . .. "
210 Most states have followed federal rule 23.1. E.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MicH. GEN. CT. R.
208.5; N.J. C!v. PRAc. R. 4:32-4, -3; N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAW 908 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAW§ 626(d) (McKinney 1963). For a more complete list, see Haudek, supra note I, at 767
n.3. See generally H. HENN, supra note I,§ 374.
211 Moreover, if the plaintiff manages nonetheless to receive a secret settlement or to be bought
off by the corporation, another shareholder may bring a second derivative action to recover the
amount received by the plaintiff. See H. HENN, supra note I,§ 374, at 790-91; Haudek, supra note
198, at 816-19.
212 For example, a court wiH not approve a dismissal conditioned on defendant's paying a fee
to plaintiffs attorney but nothing to the corporation. Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300
(S.D.N. Y. 1955). Moreover, if the plaintiff is bought off with funds from the corporate treasury,
the payment may be recovered from plaintiff for the corporation. Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
213 See H. HENN, supra note I,§ 378. Many state statutes require plaintiffs to post security for
the expenses of both the corporation and those indemnifiable by it. See note 163 supra. Although
reimbursement or posting of security for expenses will rarely compensate the corporation for all
the direct and indirect expenses it incurs, the prospect of such payments should deter frivolous
derivative suits.
214 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 374, at 791 ("[T]here remains little opportunity to derive
personal gain from a derivative action, thus seriously curbing 'strike-suits . . . .' ").
207
208
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These factors have led some to question whether strike suits
now exist to any significant degree. 21 6
In practice it still may be possible for a plaintiff to profit from a
nuisance·-suit, either because state indemnification laws or directors' liability insurance may make it possible,2 17 or because a secret settlement
may go undiscovered. 218 The problems of indemnification and liability
insurance might be remedied by revising relevant state laws. 219 To the
extent that strike suits remain a problem, they should be handled without permitting directors to halt derivative suits, except in accordance
with the proposals in this article. The directors will tend to oppose
both meritorious and nonmeritorious suits. Indeed, they may oppose
meritorious suits more energetically because such suits pose greater
threats of potential harm and embarrassment to the accused directors.
It would be preferable to deter strike suits by requiring plaintiffs to pay
the corporation's and the defendants' attorneys' fees and other expenses
where the action is found to have been brought without reasonable
cause, 220 by allowing suits for abuse of process against plaintiffs and
self.215

See notes 196-200 and accompanying text supra.
See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 65 (1968) (quoting Abraham Pomerantz, a prominent plaintiffs'
attorney, as saying that the strike suit is a "false image," an "epithet bereft of reality"). But see rd.
at 66-68 (stating that abuses of derivative litigation by plaintiffs' attorneys continue).
217 Some state statutes permit indemnification of directors for costs incurred in settlement of
derivative suits, although they probably do not include amounts to be paid by the defendants to
the corporation. See Bishop, supra note 37, at 1082-84. Thus, it may be in the short-term interest
of the corporation to encourage the defendants to settle and then accept reimbursement for their
attorneys' fees rather than to force those defendants to engage in protracted litigation, after which
the corporation may be required to pay a much larger indemnity. In the long run, however, the
corporation's interests are better served by vigorously opposing and thereby discouraging nuisance
suits. If the defendants object to making payments out of their own pockets because they believe
the suit is groundless, and if the corporation cannot directly indemnify them for amounts paid in
settlement of the suit, the corporation might make a disguised indemnification through various
forms of compensation to the defendants.
As to directors' and officers' liability insurance, the insurer would have no incentive to pay a
settlement out of its own pocket if, after litigating to a successful judgment, it could avoid payment
because the corporation would either indemnify the defendant or reimburse the insurer for paying
the defendant's costs. The policy, however, may not provide for subrogation of the insurer to the
defendant's right of indemnification and, in any case, indemnification might be discretionary.
Therefore, the insurer might be more willing to pay a small settlement than the larger costs of a
successful, litigated defense.
Thus, both indemnification and liability insurance may make it possible for a plaintiff to
profit from a strike suit.
218
.
The secret settlement could entail not only cash payments but also promises to retain plainllfl's attorney for future services. Even if such retention became known, it might be hard to conne~t it to a secret settlement. Further, rules requiring court approval of settlements of derivative
su~ts do not apply to suits threatened but not filed, Bishop, supra note 37, at 1081 n.ll, so that one
might profit by threatening without filing a nuisance suit.
219
For example, indemnification by either the corporation or an insurer might be barred in
cases of settlement" or conditioned on court approval.
220
Only a few jurisdictions currently provide for such reimbursement. See H. HENN, supra
215

216
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attorneys who bring frivolous derivative suits, and by disciplinary actions against such attorneys.z21
Even if strike suits were completely eliminated, the corporation
might still become embroiled in an expensive derivative. suit that will
yield no recovery for the corporation. Parties to all litigation face this
danger, however, and the danger does not seem any greater in the field
of derivative suits. As Professor Lattin has stated, "The cleansing effect
of the threat of such suits would seem to an impartial observer to far
outweigh the possible abuse through strike suits." 222 Permitting a director's colleagues on the board to stop a derivative suit against him
would vitiate much of this "cleansing effect" and the other benefits of
derivative suits.
The Mantifactured Pleadings Problem

The proposed approach could give a derivative plaintiff a strong
incentive to name a majority of the directors as defendants, thereby
both obviating a demand on the board and disabling the board from
thwarting the suit. This sticky problem usually arises when the plaintiff
alleges that certain persons have profited unfairly at the corporation's
expense and that most of the directors, though not profiting themselves,
have conspired in, approved, or knowingly or negligently acquiesced in
the alleged transactions. On one hand, such allegations, if true, would
not only make a demand futile and the board's opposition ineffective to
stop a derivative suit, but would also render the majority liable for
breach of the directors' duties of care and loyalty. 223 On the other
hand, to permit the plaintiff to circumvent a demand on the board and
the effects of the board's refusal to sue simply by adding a few names to
his complaint could deprive the board of any power to control corporate litigation. Furthermore, even though in theory directors may be
liable for approving or acquiescing in transactions in which they have
not profited, cases in which directors have been held so liable actually
constitute "a very small number of needles in a very large haystack." 224
Courts have feared, probably too much, that imposition ofliability for
"mere" negligence on directors, who usually receive small compensation and serve only part time, would deter the most qualified persons
from becoming directors. 225
note I, § 378, at 799 n.2. See also FED. R. C1v. P. II (if attorney signs pleadings without "knowledge, information, and belief [that] there is good ground to support it [he] may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action").
221 See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 68 (1968).
..
222 N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 115, at 457. See also text accompanying notes 241-44 infra.
223 See generally H. HENN, supra note I,§§ 218, 234-235; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, §§ 78-79.
224 See note 37 supra.
225 Thus, some courts have held that directors are liable only for gross negligence, but this test
has been criticized. See note 26 supra.
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Given these conflicting considerations, it is not surprising that the
courts have dealt with the problem in widely divergent ways. One line
of cases holds that allegations of board approval or acquiescence in the
alleged wrongs or of domination of the board by the alleged wrongdoers must be supported by particular facts and that domination by the
largest (albeit minority) shareholder will not be assumed. 226 Another
line of cases holds less specific allegations sufficient, or at least is more
willing to assume domination of the board by a large shareholder. 227
A few steps can be taken to deal with the problem without dismissing the complaint. In some cases the naming of certain directors
may be so patently frivolous that a court might dismiss the complaint
as to them. For example, dismissal might be appropriate as to defendants who were not directors at the time of the alleged wrongs. 228 On
occasion it may be appropriate to approve discovery and a trial limited
to the issue of domination of the board, or its knowledge or approval of
or acquiescence in the alleged wrong. 229 Separate claims of wrongdo226 The case most often cited is In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.),
cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), a suit charging antitrust and Investment Company Act violations
by the investment advisors and minority, affiliated directors of four mutual funds. The court held
that allegations of domination and control of the unaffiliated directors without supporting facts
were not sufficiently particular to meet the requirements of FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 for excuse of a
demand on the directors. In dictum the court said that even allegations of participation by the
majority in wrongful acts are insufficient to excuse a demand unless they include allegations of
"self-interest or other indication of bias." 479 F.2d at 265. See also Elfenbein v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (allegation of ownership of 27% of corporate stock and
possession of two nominees on board insufficient to plead domination of board); Heit v. Baird, 567
F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977); Meyers v. K~eler, 414 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (demand held not excused where unaffiliated directors
named as defendants without allegations of domination); CHICAGO Comment; supra note 3, at

17f:-78.
27

Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964)
(allegations that majority "participated in or negligently tolerated" wrongs by two directors who
owned 39% of stock held sufficient); Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(distinguishing In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions on grounds of amendment of the Investment
Company Act); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissedper curiam, 503
F.2d554 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329
N.E.2d 180, 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 506 (1975) (allegations held sufficient despite no allegation of
personal benefit by board majority). See Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971)
(allegations that directors "participated, approved of and acquiesced in" wrongs held sufficient).
q. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (allegations that directors aided and abetted the wrongdoing and
evidence that they would refuse to sue held sufficient); Brick v. Dominion Mort. & Realty Trust,
44 2 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (allegations that all directors were participants in fraudulent
scheme was sufficiently pleaded); Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (complaint naming all directors as conspirators or aiders and abettors held sufficiently
particular). See also note 39 supra.
228
See In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973). Cf. Galefv. Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5925-26 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (stating
that state and federal claims may be handled separately for dismissal purposes).
229
See note 183 and accompanying text supra.
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ing can be treated separately. Thus, if a few directors are charged With
looting the corporation and the majority are charged with acquiescin
in the looting, the former charge can be handled as a separate chargg
not implicating a majority of the directors.
e
Courts may be justly reluctant to allow bare allegations to circumvent the requirement of a demand on the board because compliance
with the requirement is so easy, 230 but the effect of a refusal to sue
raises more serious problems. Although accepting at face value the
plaintiff's allegations of domination of or collusion, approval, or acquiescence by the board may lead to abuses, this seems preferable to dismissing what may be meritorious claims, thereby negating important
shareholder rights, without full discovery and trial. Perhaps more important, given the numerous options open to the corporation to defend
itself against frivolous derivative suits and the strong incentive for
plaintiffs not to bring such suits, 231 the prospect that the corporation
may occasionally become involved in a suit that proves frivolous
should not warrant flinging another major obstacle in the path of derivative plaintiffs.
.Disregard of the

Corporation~

.Best Interests

Even a meritorious suit may be detrimental to the corporation. In
the decided cases, special litigation committees have often pointed to
the costs of litigation, the interruption of corporate business, and the
undermining of personnel morale as reasons for not bringing suit.m
To some extent these reasons could justify opposing a derivative suit.m
Although certain steps by the corporation, such as demanding security
for expenses or seeking a protective order from the court, can sometimes diminish these problems, 234 they cannot always be eliminated.
Moreover, although the shareholder-plaintiff may have little incentive
to bring a groundless derivative suit, 235 he may well have an incentive
to bring a meritorious suit even though it will be detrimental to the
See CHICAGO Comment, supra note 3, at 172-73."
See notes I 96-202 and accompanying text supra. See also FED. R. C1v. P. I I (providing for
discipline of attorneys who falsely sign pleadings).
232 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip op. at 19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (committee
concerned about costs of litigation and indemnification); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508,
514 n.I3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (committee found "little likelihood of a recovery sufficient to justify the cost of maintaining
an action"). See also note 164 supra. q. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 178, 240 P.2d
421, 428 (1952) (board may consider "cost in money, time and disruption" in deciding whether to
sue).
233 See notes 162 & 164 and accompanying text supra. See also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 773180, slip op. at 21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (directors may decide to terminate even meritorious
suits).
234 See text accompanying notes 179 & 197-200 supra.
235 See text accompanying notes 209-14 supra.
230
231
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corporation, since a court may not consider the costs and other detriments of the suit to the corporation in fixing plaintiff's attorneys'
fees.2 36 If the suit fails, the corporation not only incurs its own costs,
but also may have to reimburse the individual defendants for their
costs. 237
The proposed approach would allow the court to weigh the costs
of the suit to the corporation where a minority of the directors is
sued, 238 but not where a majority is sued. It ·can be argued that the
theoretically disinterested directors should be able to halt a derivative
suit even if brought against a majority if they believe it will harm the
corporation. Although this argument has considerable validity and is
the strongest argument against the proposed approach, it is not ultimately compelling. First, derivative suits often do produce substantial
monetary rt;coveries for the corporation. 239 Second, the cost of derivative litigation is rarely large in relation to the size of the corporation.
Moreover, a substantial part of the cost of derivative litigation results
from defendants' efforts to block plaintiff's attempt to reach a hearing
on the merits. The high cost of shareholder suits would be better attacked by legislative or judicial reform sweeping away many of these
obstacles (as well as dealing with excessive discovery by plaintiffs),
rather than by permitting directors of dubious independence to terminate such suits.
Z36 The author is not aware of any case where a court has explicitly taken such costs and
detriments into account. There are, however, several cases where courts have denied plaintiffs
attorneys' fees altogether because the plaintiff, though partly successful, conferred little benefit on
the corporation. In reSt. Clair Estate Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 964, 153 P.2d 453 (1944); Bachelder v.
Brentwood Lanes, Inc., 369 Mich. 155, 119 N.W.2d 630 (1963). That the costs of these suits to the
corporation exceeded the benefits received may have been an unspoken reason for complete denial of attorneys' fees. Furthermore, in considering whether to approve proposed settlements,
courts have often weighed the costs to the corporation of continued litigation, including adverse
effects on the company's public relations and employee morale. Protective Comm. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 196 F.2d 484, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1952);
Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 91,806
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Berger v. Dyson, Ill F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D.R.l. 1953); Hoffman v. Dann, 42
Del. Ch. 123, 139-40, 205 A.2d 343, 352-53 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965);
Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 767, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1967);
~ann v. Luke, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725, 731-32 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Indeed, the corporation may settle the
dispute with the true defendants, see note 198 supra, and the court will consider the detriment of
continued litigation to the corporation's public relations and employee morale in deciding
whether to approve the settlement. See, e.g., Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat') Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 288
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944).
237 See note 75 supra. In many cases, especially where a defendant has settled or been only
pa~ially successful at trial, a corporation may indemnify the defendant but is not statutorily required to do so. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) & (b) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 724(b) (McKinney 1963). It is questionable whether such a voluntarily incurred cost should be a
c~~se for the corporation to complain.
8
See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
239 s,ee H ornstem,
.
supra note 6, at 15-19; Hornstein, supra note 16, at 814.
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On another level, many of the benefits and detriments of derivative suits are nonmonetary or nonquantifiable. On the detriment side
the costs of interruption of business and undermining of personnel mo~
rale are difficult to estimate. It might be argued that the undermining
of personnel morale merits consideration apart from its financial impact on the corporation. Morale problems, however, will primarily affect those accused of misconduct. For them, the effect is perhaps
unfortunate but necessary if they are guilty; if they are not guilty, successful defense of the suit and reimbursement of litigation costs from
the corporation should be sufficient vindication.
On the benefit side, the monetary value to the corporation of injunctions procured on its behalf is also hard to estimate. More important is the deterrent value of shareholder suits. The broader
implications of the deterrent effect of derivative suits are discussed below, but even considering only the single corporation in question, the
deterrent value of derivative suits-though impossible to estimate-is
undoubtedly very great. 240
In sum, the quantifiable monetary costs to the corporation of a
particular suit are unlikely to harm the corporation substantially, and
in general these costs probably do not greatly exceed the quantifiable
monetary benefits of derivative suits. Moreover, the total benefits of
derivative suits far outweigh their detriments. Accordingly, the directors' decision that a derivative suit against their colleagues should be
halted because its potential costs outweigh its potential benefits should
only be considered as one relevant factor when a minority of directors
is sued and should be disregarded when a majority is sued.

r·

DETERRING CORPORATE ABUSES AND LEGITIMIZING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

In addition to the immediate, perceptible benefits a corporation
realizes from a successful derivative suit, derivative suits serve the additional, and perhaps more important, function of deterring corporate
abuses and legitimizing the corporate governance system. The deterrent effect of derivative suits, though not quantifiable, has been recognized by courts and commentators. 241 If directors and officers know
that any charge of wrongdoing on their part will be weighed by their
colleagues on the board and not by a court with the assistance of an
aggressive attorney for plaintiffs, the temptation of directors and officers to line their pockets at the expense of the shareholders will be
greatly increased, and some will succumb to the temptation.
See note 241 and accompanying text i'!fra.
See Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); N. LATTIN, supra note 3,
§ 115, at 457; Bishop, supra note 37, at 1087 ("[T]he principal legal d~terrent to the common
varieties of self-dealing is probably fear of civil liability."); Hornstein, supra note 6, at 31.
240
241
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If corporate abuses increase, shareholders will not be the only
- losers. There has been growing criticism of, and even cynicism toward,
the corporate governance system,242 and any judicially created rule that
encourages corporate abuses by limiting derivative suits will breed
more of the same. 243 A review of the various proposals to improve corporate governance is beyond the scope of this article. It suffices to say
that broad availability of derivative suits to disgruntled minority shareholders not only is consistent with these proposals but, as compared
with them, has the advantage of requiring minimal governmental interference with corporate management and no additional legislation.
It is not surprising that corporate officers and directors should oppose derivative suits, but their opposition is shortsighted. If courts allow corporate miscreants to go free at the behest of the miscreants'
fellow directors, public resentment will force changes in corporate governance laws-<:hanges that corporations almost certainly will find
more onerous than derivative suits.244
CONCLUSION

Recent decisions granting the board of directors broad powers to
terminate derivative suits have created a grave danger that serious
wrongs by corporate insiders may go unchallenged. The proposals set
forth in this article would drastically reduce that danger without rendering the corporation defenseless against frivolous or unduly costly
derivative suits. The question remains who will see that these proposals, or something like them, are put into effect.
The state legislatures are unlikely to do so. Most state legislation
during the last forty years has been designed to limit derivative suits,
not encourage them. 245 Congress cannot act directly to amend laws
relating to state-created derivative actions and is unlikely to authorize
federal derivative actions dealing with abuses by corporate insiders
generally, although it might deal with the problem by requiring federal
chartering or minimum standards for state chartering. 246 Also, Burks v.
Lasker 247 makes it likely that the federal courts will follow state law as
242

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 83, at 1104 & ll08 n.l9 (the latter containing a brief list of
proposals for reform).
243 See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct.
1831 (1979) ("[I]t cannot be expected that the public or the Fund's stockholders would believe that
· · · statutorily disinterested directors could act with that impartiality and objectivity which the
public interest requires.").
·
244
For example, Senator Metzenbaum is planning to introduce a bill to establish minimum
federal standards for state chartering of certain corporations. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1
(Dec. 12, 1979).
245 See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
246 "
<>ee note 244 supra.
2 47
99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979).
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to whether the board may terminate derivative suits. 248 Therefore, relief must come from the state courts. Although the judicial record to
date is not encouraging, a change of direction is quite possible.
First, the precedents will not bind too tightly a court that wants to
impose meaningful limits on board termination of derivative suits.
Most of the special litigation committee cases arose either in New york
courts or in federal courts that tried to apply state law that was, except
as to New York, almost nonexistent. 249 Even in New York, the special
facts of Auerbach v. Bennett 250 make it easy to distinguish. 251 Most
other refusal-to-sue cases have also been decided by federal courts.
Thus, there is firm authority for board termination of derivative suits in
only few states. Second, since most of the cases purport to apply the
business judgment rule, a court could go far toward adopting the proposals contained herein by taking the reasonable view that the business
judgment rule requires clear proof both of the directors' independence
and of their reasonably prudent investigation of the facts. 252 Finally,
the recent Delaware cases on "going private" transactions 253 show that
state courts can act quickly to enforce fiduciary duties when they
choose to do so, even though precedents suggest that they might not act
at all.254
In sum, the path is still open for state courts to remedy the dangers
created by board termination of derivative suits, thereby preserving the
derivative suit as an important tool to maintain the integrity of corporate officers and directors. To reject this path and to follow instead the
path suggested by the cases to date will certainly mean the virtual death
of the derivative suit.
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See notes 43-50 and accompanying text supra.
See generally text accompanying notes 51-69 supra.
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
See note 64 supra.
See note 26 supra.
See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Sup. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Sup. 1977); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
254 Indeed, the Delaware courts may already have begun to act. In Maldonado v. Flynn, No.
4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980), decided while this article was going to press, the court held that the
business judgment rule is irrelevant to an attempt by a supposedly independent board committee
to terminate a derivative suit charging breach of fiduciary duty. The court therefore denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. This decision, together with Galefv. Alexander, No. 797166 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (holding that the board may not terminate a derivative suit naming all
the directors as defendants), may presage a split among the courts, prompting a thorough reconsideration of the path the courts have been taking.
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